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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to understand various factors involved with the intervention of 
powerful countries in the affairs of weaker countries, taking the Indian intervention in Sri 
Lanka as a case study. It examines shifts in India’s intervention decisions during the 
period between the contemporary independence of both countries and the end of the 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009. The thesis primarily focuses upon four significant 
incidents that triggered intervention by India in Sri Lanka, and explores how India’s 
domestic concerns and strategic interests affected India’s intervention decisions under 
various socio-economic and geo-political situations. 
 By analyzing both strategic and domestic concerns and how they impacted India’s 
intervention in Sri Lanka during the concerned period, this thesis argues that the Indian 
decision for intervention in Sri Lanka is deeply shaped by its strong domestic concerns. 
Indian governments adjusted their intervention decisions to maintain the domestic 
stability of the country, irrespective of the strategic impact of intervention. Even though 
Indian governments preferred to maintain a cordial relationship with Sri Lanka, domestic 
pressure could compel Indian governments to intervene in Sri Lanka. Sometimes, India 
decided not to intervene when the pressure on the central government was weak, or when 
more important domestic concerns arose which favored non-intervention. As far as 
India’s intervention decisions in the future are concerned, domestic factors will constrain 
India’s flexibility in shaping decisions to intervene in Sri Lanka.    
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With the termination of the Cold War era, global conflicts have changed and 
resulted in a new global conflict management system. The world witnessed a rapid 
decrease of traditional interstate disputes and a comparable increase of intrastate 
disputes.1 Most of these disputes were based on structural, political, socio-economic, and 
cultural/perceptual factors. Because these intrastate conflicts were during the Cold War 
era, most of them were subsumed under wide ranging U.S.-Soviet rivalry.2 Sometimes, 
major international organizations intervened to solve these problems with the keen 
interest and directives of the major superpowers. The unipolar power system—which 
emerged with the termination of Cold War era—changed the global conflict management 
system and showed little interest in intrastate conflicts. Countries did not intervene unless 
driven by self-motivation.3  Sometimes, they intervened under the guise of humanitarian 
intervention to fulfill their self-interests. As a result, intrastate conflicts tended to be more 
autonomous from the sphere of major states.4  This situation has produced a new political 
order that encourages the emergence of intrastate conflicts all over the world leading to 
the situation we see today. 
This new political order, in the absence of the classic competition of the great 
powers, demands the intervention of third parties—especially regional organizations and 
stronger countries—to solve the internal conflicts of other nations.5 Most continents, with 
                                                 
1 Neil MacFarlance, Intervention in Contemporary Wold Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 50. 
2 Geoffrey Kemp, “Regional Security, Arms Control and the End of Cold War,” in Resolving Third 
World Conflict: Challenges for a new Era, eds. Sheryl J. Brown and kimber M. Schraub (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), 124.   
3 Chester A. Crocker, “Intervention,” in Turbulent Peace : The Challenges of Managing International 
Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall  (Washington:United States 
Institute of Peace Press,2001), 233.  
4 Paul F. Diehl and Joseph Lepgold, Regional Conflict Management (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 10. 
5 Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 133. 
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the exception of Asia, have their own region-wide organizations.6  Therefore, there is a 
greater chance that individual countries will get involved. When there is no effective 
collective conflict-management system to solve problems, the stronger country in the 
region—militarily and economically—usually tends to intervene to solve the intrastate 
conflicts between the weaker countries in the region; and this intervention is usually 
guided by self-interest.  
The attitudes and motivations of the third party can change both the nature of the 
conflict and the end result of the intervention. Sometimes, interventions increase the 
severity of the conflicts in terms of killing more humans and resulting in many more 
billions of damage to infrastructures. According to Edward N. Luttwak, “their suggested 
ceasefires and armistices, sometimes, prevent the transformation of war into peace.”7 
Meanwhile, some countries sabotage the processes of intervention to achieve their own 
political interests. Good motivations and attitudes do not always bring favorable results. 
The success or failure of interventions which have good attitudes and motivations 
depends on the capability of the intervener, the socio-political acceptance of the 
subjective country, and the stage of the conflict.8  
 Intervention is a projection of power. A powerful country’s aspiration  to 
establish peace is often connected with many motives which project their power politics.9  
As medium-strong countries have limited foreign policy instruments, they use their 
intervention as a tool to enhance the prestige and the power of influence in the region. 
Sometimes, this method is used to contain a dispute that may spill over into the 
mediator’s territory. It may also be used to deny their rivals’ opportunities to intervene in 
a particular regional problem.    
                                                 
6 Connie Peck, “ The role of Regional Organizations in Preventing and Resolving Conflict,” in 
Turbulent Peace: A Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Haampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 563. 
7 Edward N. Luttwak, “ The Curse of Inconclusive Intervention,,” in Turbulent Peace: A Challenges 
of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Haampson, and Pamela Aall 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 268. 
8 Crocker, “Intervention,” 233. 
9William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “Mediation: The Role of Third Party Diplomacy and Informal 
Peacekeeping,” in Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a new Era, ed. Sheryl J. Brown and 
kimber M. Schraub (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), 243. 
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While intervention—without a doubt—is about projecting power, the decision to 
intervene is not always shaped by projection of power, and it may not be the only factor 
that shapes the decision to intervene. The focus of this thesis is to identify some of the 
factors that shape intervention. While projection of power motivation may drive the 
initial decision, the actual intervention is shaped by various other issues, including 
domestic ones. 
The existing literature on intervention by strong countries into the intrastate 
conflicts of weaker countries can be divided into three categories. The first set of 
arguments support domestic concerns as the main cause of intervention. The second set 
of arguments outline strategic reasons as the main cause of intervention. The third 
category offers the argument that the primary motivation for intervention motivation is 
usually a combination of various factors, and cannot be categorized as falling exclusively 
under domestic or strategic concerns. 
This thesis will try to discern the various factors involved in this type of 
intervention by looking at the case of India’s intervention in Sri Lanka. In 1987, the 
Indian government forced the Sri Lanka government to stop their ongoing successful war 
against LTTE terrorists. In 2000, India chose not to intervene to save the lives of 40,000 
Sri Lankan soldiers who were trapped in Jaffna peninsula due to an LTTE offensive—
even though the Sri Lanka government requested intervention by India to save those 
lives. However, when the Sri Lankan government again launched a mass-scale operation 
against the LTTE terrorists in 2009, the government of India did not interfere as they did 
in 1987. This attitude of the Indian government gives rise to a series of critical questions: 
What is the driving force behind these two very different decisions? Is it domestic or 
strategic? What is driving India’s foreign policy towards Sri Lanka? Why has India not 
intervened in the current state—one which presents a logical opportunity to do so? Does 
the case of Indian intervention policy in Sri Lanka support the domestic or the strategic 
argument in the literature?  
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B. IMPORTANCE      
Although opponents in a conflict welcome intervention by a third party to produce 
favorable results, the third parties usually intervene with motivations that fulfill their own 
interests, rather than those of the two opposing forces. Such interventions can  affect the 
continuation of the war, and may also amplify the severity of the war and increase the 
total amount of destruction. 
Humanitarian interventions are among the most controversial, as they threaten the 
sovereignty of the subjective country under the pretense of protecting human rights.10 
During the Cold War era, the sovereignty of weaker countries was maintained under ‘big 
brother’ protection; however, with the termination of it, stronger countries started to 
breach the sovereignty of weaker countries with varying intentions under the guise of 
humanitarian intervention.11  
Fluctuating decisions of the intervener, over a period of time, may drastically 
influence the war and the internal matters of the [target or subjective] country. Any shifts 
in intervention style during a war may affect the credibility of the intervener, and 
drastically change the shape of the dispute. Furthermore, improper intervention practices 
raise significant questions about state sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction, and the 
legitimate use of force. The case of Indian’s relations with Sri Lanka will help us 
understand these various factors. Therefore, the study of this case makes an important 
contribution to the literature about intervention in the post-Cold-War period.  
 The case study is also important for Sri Lanka, and the region of South Asia in 
particular, as Sri Lanka has been invaded 17 times by India in the past 2500 years.12  To 
understand what motives India (or Indian principalities over the years) had to enter Sri 
Lanka will also help predict the future. Knowing those concerns, the policy makers of Sri 
Lanka can formulate its national and foreign policy to establish a mutually beneficial 
                                                 
10 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Politics: An Introduction to Theory and History (New 
York: Pearson, 2009), 166–168. 
11 Richard K. Betts, Conflict After the Cold War (New York: Pearson, 2008), 246. 
12 Rohan Gunarathne, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies 
(Colombo: Gunarathne Offset, 1993),473. 
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relationship with India. Furthermore, this finding is equally important for the region of 
South Asia, as India is a powerful actor and its relationship with a smaller country 
presents an important example for others and the future of the region. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
India has always preferred keeping Sri Lanka under its hegemony. Geo-politically 
and socio-economically, Sri Lanka has remained very important for India during the post-
colonial period. Therefore, the strategic concern of India in Sri Lanka has been  
constant—except when there was something specific to domestic policy that directly 
affected strategic concerns. The degree to which these strategic concerns have captured 
India’s attention has varied, but there is no doubt that India has always looked at Sri 
Lanka as an vital factor of its foreign policy. What then, explains the huge variation—
from one situation to the next—in its policy towards Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict?   
Therefore, my argument in this research is that the decision by the Indian 
governments to intervene in the Sri Lankan intrastate conflict is deeply shaped by its own 
domestic concerns. While strategic concerns have fairly remained constant or even when 
strategic concerns have been high, India’s intervention behavior has varied with changes 
in domestic variables. In other words, strategic interests remained fairly constant and 
domestic interest varied, resulting in an alternating pattern of intervention decisions In 
fact, I support the argument in the literature that domestic concerns often trump the 
strategic concerns of intervention. That means that domestic concerns drove foreign 
policy, even though strategic concerns provided the primary reasons to intervene. 
 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Domestic Concern as Motivation for Intervention 
Michel Keren and Donald A. Sylvan’s work offers a summary of domestic 
reasons for intervention by looking at the case of American and French intervention in 
the conflict of Rwanda/Burundi in 1994 and 1996. According to their findings, the 
French decision to intervene in 1994 was driven by a mixture of three factors: guilt, 
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genuine concern, and domestic political pressure. When the same genocide took place 
again on a lesser scale, the French government did not intervene to solve the conflict. 
Karen and Sylvan argue that the Rwandan crisis in 1996 was less an issue of genocide 
and more an issue of humanitarian crisis. Therefore, they had no domestic political 
pressure to intervene as in 1994. The domestic decision was that it was a problem that 
should be dealt with by the NGOs.13  
When the United States is concerned, they did not intervene in the conflict of 
Rwanda/Burundi in 1994, but they intervened in 1996 because of the changes of the 
domestic public opinion. According to Karen and Sylvan the main reason for non-
intervention in 1994 was the ill-conceived humanitarian mission in Somalia four years 
before. Therefore, there was a strong public pressure against the intervention in another 
conflict. The ambiguity of whether the situation in Rwanda met the legal definition of 
genocide by international humanitarian law also affected the decision for non-
intervention. However, in 1996, the United States intervened to assist the refugees with 
their immediate humanitarian needs, but the intervention force could only receive orders 
from U.S. commanders. Authors argue that this situation was a result of the constraint 
drum beat of domestic public opinion. However, there are some gaps in this study. For 
instance, these authors identified the different motives for intervention by the two 
countries in 1994 and 1996, but they did not address why those countries intervened 
differently, and at different stages of the same problem. Furthermore, they have not 
attempted to compare the situations in 1994 and 1996 to find out the similar and different 
factors, which directly impacted intervention decisions.  
Meanwhile, Patrick M. Ragan provides a better understanding of the domestic 
pressure for intervention. He posits the conditions that the intervener should satisfy prior 
to an intervention. He writes that a “decision of intervention is not a function of the 
moves or countermeasures of the target country but rather a result of internal processes in 
                                                 
13 Micheal Meren and Donald A. Sylvan, International Intervention: Sovereignty versus 
Responsibility (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 63–69. 
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intervening country.”14 Furthermore, he says that “if the estimated probability of a 
successful outcome with an intervention is low, then the state is unlikely to intervene.”15 
His argument rings true, but he needs to specify how internal processes contribute to the 
decision for intervention in another country. I hope to demonstrate this in the case of 
India’s intervention in Sri Lanka. 
David Carment and James Patric state that cultural affinities between the 
intervening country and the target country initiate the intervention.16 This kind of 
intervention often occurs between border-sharing countries. In such circumstances, 
domestic concerns are the main cause of intervention. The case study of India in Sri 
Lanka is an example of an intervention based on cultural affinities. While accepting this 
humanitarian aspect of intervention, Robert L. Phillips and Duane L. Cady describe the 
moral foundation of the initiation of intervention. According to them, states intervene to 
help people who are in need, and the motive for intervention is ethical.17 
Domestic politics sometimes play a major role, both as constraints and 
opportunities, in intervention. Furthermore, these domestic policies considerably affect 
the formulation of foreign policies that drive decisions to intervene. Thomas Princen sees 
the interests of intervention based on domestic concerns. He describes how representative 
governments have more constraints than governments based on one party. In addition to 
the intervener’s domestic concerns, he says that the domestic concerns of the opponents 
in the dispute also play a considerable role.18 In the issue of India’s intervention in Sri 
Lanka, the Indian government led by the Congress Party in 1987 and the government lead 
by the United Progressive Alliance in 2009 acted in a considerably different manner. 
Where the domestic concerns of the opponents are concerned, the LTTE expected India’s 
                                                 
14  Patric M. Ragan, Ragon, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervantion in Intrastste 
Conflic (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 42. 
15 Ibid., 44. 
16  David Carment and James Patric, “International Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: 
Towards a Crisis – Based Assesment of Irredentism,” Journal of the Conflict Resolution 39, no.1 (1995a): 
82–109. 
17 Robert L. Phillips and Duane L. Cady, Humanitarian Intervention: Just War Vs. Pacifism (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996) 5–7, 65. 
18 Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, 222–223. 
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intervention in 1987 and 2009, but the government of Sri Lanka wanted to settle the 
problem on its own.   
2. Strategic Concerns as Motivation for Intervention 
Saadia Touval and William Zartman examine the strategic causes of intervention. 
They say that stronger powers intervene to obtain the gratitude of either one or both 
opponents, to deny the non-regional powers’ opportunities for intervention, and to 
become a responsible state in the region with the intent to project their power. In fact, 
they say, “states use intervention as a foreign policy instrument.”19  However, they argue, 
comparatively, a “mediation by small and medium-sized powers is also self-interest, 
some of which is related to domestic issues.”20 Basically, they intervene to enhance their 
influence and prestige, since they have very limited foreign policy tools.        
In his book, Intermediaries in International Conflict, Thomas Princen divides the 
intervener’s interests into two categories: public and private. He posits that public interest 
is the establishment of peace extended to the larger community. The other category—
private interest—is settling the dispute with the intention of gaining prestige and a sense 
of worth among other countries. These kinds of motives address the strategic concerns of 
intervening countries. For example, Algeria enhanced its international status by 
successfully intervening in the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis in 1979.21  
Martha Finnemore says that decisions for intervention are a combination of 
norms, interests, and actions. She understands that norms shape interests and interests 
shape actions. Sometimes, strategic factors—like power constraints—shape the behavior 
of the intervener. According to her studies, these norms make favorable conditions for 
                                                 
19 Saadia Touval and Willium Zartman, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era,” in 
Turbulent Peace: A Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Haampson, and Pamela Aall  (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 428. 
20 Ibid., 431. 
21 Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, 50. 
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intervention, but do not determine it.22 In fact, she admits that it is strategic concerns that 
drive a state towards intervention.  
Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason says that countries intervene in the conflicts of 
other countries to project their power over strategic concerns. He defines intervention as 
an instrument of foreign policy. According to his arguments, countries use intervention to 
achieve interests that are determined by politics. They use defensive intervention to 
maintain current external policies, and they use offensive intervention to change the 
regime and the policy of the target country. In sum, he says “intervention is an instrument 
of foreign policy that is applied by a superior state when its power fails to move the target 
state in the intended direction.”23 Jacob Bercovitch also agrees with Thomas, and he 
further elaborates on the political incentive for intervention. According to him, countries 
intervene to achieve political interests without arousing opposition.24  
3. The Alternative: Understanding Motivations for Interventions 
Some arguments about the motivation for intervention cannot be specifically 
categorized either under domestic or strategic concerns. Some arguments under this 
category are neither domestic nor strategic. Meanwhile, some arguments equally fit for 
both the concerns.  
Patrick M. Regan explaining the terms of intervention, positing that, intervention 
takes place when, “there is a reasonable expectation of success, the projected time 
horizon for achieving the outcome is short, and domestic opposition is minimal.”25 
Converse to this argument, Robert C. Toth and Kohut Andrew  say that humanitarian 
                                                 
22 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Conflict After the Cold 
War, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Pearson, 2008), 236–238. 
23 Thomas G. Otte, “On Intervention: Some Introductory remarks,” in Military Intervention: From 
Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Andrew M. Dorman and Thomas G. Otte 
(Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishers, 1995), 7. 
24 Jacob Bercovitch, “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of 
Practice,” in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, ed. William Zartman and 
Lewis Rasmussen (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 133–135. 
25 Ragon, Civil Wars and Civil Powers, 5.  
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aspects are more salient in an intervention than the interests.26 According to Blechman, 
the moral dilemma of the constituencies instigates the governments to intervene.27 
Micheal and Donald have studied about the social psychological profile of an 
intervention, and they have found three main psychological factors that drive the decision 
for intervention: cost/reward analysis, empathy, and similarity. First, they say, an 
intervention is a result of a cost/reward analysis. Intervention  gets encouraged when its 
cost is relatively less and the expected benefits are high. Similarly, when intervention 
gives cheaper option to a problem. Second, an intervention is a result of empathy with the 
subjective party’s pain. Mass media is a primary driver for interventions based on 
empathy. Upon being informed of catastrophes, countries sometimes intervene in 
another’s conflicts even though the intervention does not support cost-benefit analysis. 
Third, decisions for intervention are influenced by an extended or constricted perspective. 
In other words, similarity between groups enhances empathy, and dissimilarity inhibits 
empathy.28  
Some scholars express that there are no common motives for interventions. For 
example, as Robert Cooper and Berdal Mats describe: “third party intervention is sui 
generis.” According to them, “third party interventions are themselves unique and that 
therefore the motives and strategies of intervention will always vary from case to case.”29 
According to the “Contingency Model,” there is a direct combination between the 
state of intensity and the method of intervention.30 According to that model, there are 
four stages of escalation in any conflict: discussion, polarization, segregation, and 
destruction. In the discussion stage, the methods of intervention are conciliation and 
negotiation, and when the conflict shifts to the polarization stage, the methods of 
                                                 
26 Andrew Kohut and Toth C. Roberth, “Arms and People,” Foreign Affairs 73, no.6 (1994): 47–61.  
27 Bary M. Blechman, “The Intervention Dilemma,” Washington Quarterly 18, no.3 (1995):  63–73. 
28 Ibid.,52–54.  
29 Robert Cooper and Berdal Mats, “Outside Intervention in Ethnic conflicts,” Survival  35, no.5 
(1993): 134. 
30 Fisher, Ronald J. and Loraleigh Keashley, “The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and 
Consultation Within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention,” Journal of Peace Research 28, 
no.1 (1991): 29–42. 
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intervention changes to consultation and pure mediation. In the next escalation stage, 
segregation, the third-party intervenes with arbitration and power mediation. Then, in the 
final stage of escalation, destruction, the interveners use peacekeeping and arbitration to 
solve conflicts. 
However, when it comes to practice, this model is very simplistic. Most 
interveners do not follow this concrete sequence, and there is no definite criterion to 
differentiate the stages of escalation. Furthermore, the method of intervention is mostly 
dependent upon the different motives of the interveners. Also, interveners use different 
methods of interventions, even though the stage of conflict remains same. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis considers logically whether India was driven by domestic or strategic 
concerns in its intervention in the Sri Lankan intrastate conflict, based on the descriptive 
case study analysis method. Four significant Indian intervention policy decisions—which 
shaped the decision to either continue or end the Sri Lanka war—are analyzed to discover 
India’s motivations. The first decision is India’s two-pronged policy approach in Sri 
Lanka after the anti-Tamil riots in 1983. The second intervention decision is India’s move 
to stop the successful government operation against the LTTE organization in 1987. The 
third is India’s non-intervention in 2000 to save the lives of 40,000 Sri Lankan soldiers 
who were trapped in Jaffna peninsula due to an LTTE offensive. At that time, the Sri 
Lankan government requested that India intervene to save those lives. The forth is India’s 
non-intervention to stop the successful government operation against the LTTE 
organization in 2009. On these four occasions, the domestic situation in Sri Lanka, was 
more or less the same, but Indian decision of intervention was different. That means 
domestic situation in Sri Lanka was not the deciding factor of intervention. The decision 
of India’s intervention points to factors which are external to Sri Lanka. Therefore, these 
three significant incidents will be analyzed, to understand what the non-Sri Lankan 
motivations were for India.  
This thesis is proceeded in the following manner. Initially, I explore India’s 
domestic policy in 1987, 2000, and 2009—and then I analyze the domestic situation in 
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order to find the possible differences that drove the decisions for intervention and non-
intervention. Then, the thesis describes the nature of the foreign policy of India in 1987, 
2000, and 2009—which is analyzed to determine the possible strategic policy differences, 
in an attempt to learn the differences in strategic concerns as they relate to intervention. 
 After describing the contemporary domestic and strategic concerns in 1987, 
2000, and 2009, I then explore the connection between domestic policy and strategic 
policy in India. With that, I hope to determine whether or not domestic concerns trumped 
strategic concerns for intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict. 
The resources for this thesis include publications comprised of books, news 
reports, journals, official documents, and academic articles available on reliable websites. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW   
Chapter II focuses on the contextualization Indian intervention in Sri Lanka from 
contemporary independence to the initiation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. It discusses 
Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in four sections: historical Indo-Lanka relations, 
relations during colonial period, and relations during the Nehruvian and the post-
Nehruvian periods. Chapter II argues that strategic concerns were not the factor that 
shaped India’s intervention during this period, since India did not have many strategic 
reasons to intervene. Furthermore, it argues that there were domestic factors for India to 
intervene during this period, but they were not strong enough to convince the Indian 
central government to intervene. Finally, it shows that the non-availability of strong 
domestic concerns was the reason of non-intervention during this period. 
Chapter III addresses dynamic Indian domestic concerns that supported 
intervention. It focuses on the first decade after the initiation of ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka. It addresses the question of why India suddenly changed to an interventionist 
phase in the 1980s. Focusing on two main incidents which led India to intervene in Sri 
Lanka, this chapter argues that the availability of strong domestic concerns was the 
reason behind new interventionist attitude of India. 
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The role of India’s domestic concerns in this transformation—and its decisions 
for intervention in the 2000s—is the main focus of Chapter IV. This chapter basically 
analyzes India’s shift to a hands-off interventionist attitude after the IPKF debacle and 
assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India. The first section describes the 
background setting of the hands-off policy. The other two sections focus on two 
significant incidents which show how domestic concerns—rather than strategic 
concerns—shaped India’s decision to intervene in Sri Lanka. These two incidents 
exemplify how India’s decision for intervention varied in direct accordance with its 
domestic concerns.  
Chapter V concludes by analyzing how the decision for intervention varied with 
the contemporary domestic situation in India by considering the entire period following 
India’s independence. Furthermore, it predicts how India’s future decisions related to 
intervention will change in the future based on the analysis. 
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II. CONTEXTUALIZING INDIAN INTERVENTION IN SRI 
 LANKA:  INDO-SRI LANKA RELATIONS UNTIL 1983 
India and Sri Lanka gained independence in 1947 and 1948, respectively, yet both 
countries experienced different independence struggles and were exposed to very 
different political circumstances after independence. Their different political experiences 
and structures has shaped their relationship with each other. In other words, Indian 
intervention over Sri Lanka and the country’s response to it is based on their experiences 
as well as current domestic events. This chapter illustrates this by looking at the history 
of the two countries until 1983. 
Indians organized both violent and non-violent movements at national and 
regional levels to gain independence from the British imperial authority. The Quit India 
Movement reached its peaks during the World War ll, and withdrew the British in 1947. 
Immediately after independence, India fought with Pakistan in dispute over Kashmir, and 
showed Indian superiority in the region. By contrast Sri Lankan independence occurred 
as a part of the British region in the department without any major independence 
movements, and there were no significant clashes in the country after independence. 
India’s experiences have shaped defense structures as the country has a need to defend its 
borders. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka looks as Indian assertions in a defensive and suspicious 
way, because the Sri Lankan military strength was inferior to tackle  possible  aggression 
of India. This insecurity defined relations between the two countries after the 
independence. 
In spite of the psychological impact of India’s regional hegemonic power and its 
superiority in terms of geographical size, population, and resources, India did not 
intervene in Sri Lankan affairs until the emergence of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 1983. Prior 
to 1983, there were reasons for India’s intervention—most of them relating to India’s 
strategic concerns—but it did not intervene, except to hold dialogue at the diplomatic 
level over common bi-lateral issues. This non-interventionist behavior leads to the 
question of why India did not intervene in Sri Lankan matters until the ethnic war started 
in Sri Lanka. This question is the main focus of this chapter. India did not intervene in Sri 
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Lanka during the post-independence phase until the initiation of ethnic conflict, since 
there were no important domestic concerns calling for intervention, despite the presence 
of a few strategic concerns. It would appear seems that that the lack of intervention 
during this period was the result of the non-availability of any such considerable 
domestic factors.  
This chapter is divided into three sections describing the three eras of India policy 
towards Sri Lanka: the historical era prior to independence, the Nehruvian era, and the 
post-Nehruvian era (which extends up to the initiation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka). 
The first section of this chapter describes the historical aspects of the Indo-Lanka 
relationship up to the contemporary independence of both countries, because 
understanding post-independence Indo-Lanka relations requires some knowledge of the 
historical relationship between the two countries. The second section describes Indo-
Lanka relations during the Nehruvian era and how India and Sri Lanka continued post-
colonial bi-lateral relations under the auspices of Jawaharlal Nehru. This era is of 
momentous importance to Indo-Ceylon relations because of the surfacing of issues rooted 
in the colonial period. Furthermore, this section describes the situational policies of the 
ruling regimes in Sri Lanka that affected the domestic and strategic concerns of India, 
and how Nehru shaped all those controversial issues as a universally admired and 
respected Asian leader. The third section covers the post-Nehruvian era up to 1983. This 
section describes in detail how the successive Indian governments after Nehru dealt with 
these issues through mutual dialogue and understanding.  
A. HISTORICAL INDO-LANKA RELATIONS 
Indo-Lanka relations have a long-rooted history of 2500 years. Sinhalese, the 
majority of Sri Lankans, are descendants of settlers who came from North India, and they 
inherited their religion—Buddhism, also from India—2300 years ago. The next largest 
population in Sri Lanka, the Tamils, has historical affinities with South India. Some of 
them are descendants of South Indian invaders,31 and some are descendants of Indian 
Tamils who were brought to Sri Lanka by colonial powers. These communal and 
                                                 
31 S.U. kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations (Colombo: Colombo Apothecaries, 1965), 2. 
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religious affinities between the two countries provide the foundation of Indo-Lanka 
relations, but the same affinities sometimes cause problems between the two countries.  
1. Communal and Religious Affinities  
According to the great chronicle of Sri Lanka, Mahawamsa, the Sinhalese 
originated from the Aryans who lived in North India. The story is that King Vijaya, who 
came to Sri Lanka in 542 B.C. with 700 of his followers, was the first Aryan in Sri 
Lanka, and that Sinhalese history started with his arrival. The Sinhalese language and 
literature owes much to indigenous Indian languages and literacy forms, and until the 
eleventh century A.D. the Sinhalese were closely affiliated with North Indian culture.  
According to Sinhalese mytho-history, Buddhism spread from India over 2300 
years ago, and it was the main bond between the two countries in ancient history. King 
Ashoka,,( 273–232 BC) sent an emissary to propagate Buddhism in Ceylon—and 
therefore never invaded Ceylon because of the countries’ close relationship based on 
Buddhism.32 As a result, ancient empires from North India did not extend to extreme 
south of peninsula.33 Annually, thousands of people made pilgrimage to places sacred to 
Buddhism in India and brought arts and architecture which was Buddhist in character to 
Sri Lanka. The story of Indo-Lanka relations, therefore, began when Buddhism spread 
from India to Sri Lanka.34 
The South Indian invasions started during the eleventh to fifteenth centuries, as 
several South Indian empires—the Chola , the Pandyan , and the Vijayan—rose during 
this period. These empires had a profound impact on Ceylon, both politically and 
culturally..35 Some of descendants of the Tamil invaders settled in the northern and 
                                                 
32 D Wijesinghe, “Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy,” Sunday Observer, August 22, 2010. 
33 S.U. kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations, 1. 
34 Sumit Ganguly, Indian Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 34. 
35 Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations, 2. 
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eastern parts of the country36 and established an independent kingdom in the North 
during the ninth century, which continued until the Portuguese conquered the country in 
1505.  
South Indian influence in Sri Lanka increased with the bringing of wives for Sri 
Lankan kings from the Royal families of South India. The first king, Vijaya, brought his 
wife from a royal family in Madurai, and also brought wives for his followers Tamil 
areas37close to 542 B.C. After the tenth century, many Sinhalese kings continued this 
custom. These intermarriages paved way many other Tamils to come and settle in Sri 
Lanka.  
After a few centuries, these Tamil settlers appeared as the second largest 
population in Sri Lanka. They predominantly settled in the northern and eastern part of 
the country. Even though Tamils mainly plantation workers, did not remain in contact 
with their South Indian ancestors, their linguistic, religious, and cultural affinities 
remained the same. 
In addition to communal and religious affinities, India and Sri Lanka have been 
economically connected since ancient times. People traded their goods through the 
narrow Palk Strait between India and Sri Lanka. There were many ports along the 
Southern coast of India and northern coastline of Sri Lanka. With the British invasion, 
this trading system was prohibited because the British wanted to monopolize trade, 
keeping Colombo as the central marketplace. This ancient trading system therefore 
became a form of “smuggling” under the British.38  
2. Indian Labor-Immigration to Sri Lanka 
Even though immigration from India to Sri Lanka was a traditional and long- 
rooted activity, Indian immigration during the British colonial period had some peculiar 
                                                 
36 David Feith, “Tamil and Sinhala Relations in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Contemporary 
Perspective,” Global Change, Peace and Security 22, no. 3, (October 2010): 346, accessed  November 18, 
2012, http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf /10.1080/14781158 .2010. 
37 Ibid., 346. 
38 Ibid., 34. 
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features. Traditionally, immigration from India to Sri Lanka was generally for the 
purpose of colonization. People settled in Sri Lanka and merged with the indigenous 
people.39 Indian who migrated as part of the British Empire, were distinct in the sense 
that they were there as temporary labor. Indian immigration increased drastically during 
the nineteenth century as British government utilized Indians as a cheap labor force in the 
plantation and construction sectors.40 The British used this strategy because a foreign 
labor force was easier to control than an indigenous one. Initially, British government 
developed coffee plantations in Sri Lanka in the 1830s, but these were destroyed by a leaf 
fungus in 1880s. After that, British capitalist enterprises started to grow tea instead of 
coffee. In the early decades of the twentieth century, rubber plantations were opened in 
the midland and low-country areas of the island. All of this was done through the use of 
labor from India. Furthermore, British utilized Indian workers for the construction of 
roads, railroads, ports, and other daily employment in the government and mercantile 
sectors. These new programs needed a considerable work force, and these programs 
paved way for Indian Tamils to migrate to Sri Lanka as unskilled labors.41 Therefore, 
they retained their connections with India.42 
B. THE ORIGIN OF INDO-LANKA QUESTION DURING THE COLONIAL 
PERIOD 
Indian Tamils who worked in the tea and rubber states became the source  a rift 
between India and Sri Lanka.The Ceylon government--with the expansion of the Indian 
Tamil population under the British--faced a controversial question:  whether this growing 
population could be assimilated into the island’s permanent population or retained as 
South Indians who temporarily stayed on the island as workers. There were two main 
factors behind the origin of this controversial issue: first, the decision of His Majesty’s 
                                                 
39 Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations, 5. 
40 Nira Wickramasinghe, “Sri Lanka: The Many Faces of Security,” in Asian Security Practice: 
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41 Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations, 5–6. 
42 Ibid., 5–6. 
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government to introduce a new constitution in 1931; second, the anti-immigration 
attitudes among the Sinhalese that emerged during the depression of the early 1930s. 
The growing Tamil population acquired political prominence in Sri Lankan 
politics in 1931 with the decision of the Donoughmore Commission to introduce a semi-
responsible form of government to Sri Lanka based on the adult franchise.43 With this 
decision, a controversial question arose about who should be given the voting privilege. 
The Indian Tamils, who were 818,500 in number by that time, were at the heart of the 
issue.44 Since Indian Tamils were not assimilated into the island’s population at that 
time, the unofficial Sinhalese members of the legislative council rejected the new 
constitution that enfranchised Indian Tamils. Later, the Commission proposed that Indian 
Tamils who have an abiding interest in the country—and those who have permanently 
settled in the country—should be enfranchised, but Sinhalese leaders did not accept any 
form of constitution that enfranchised Indian Tamils. Therefore, the Commission’s 
proposal was revised. According to the revised constitution, Indian Tamils who had 
“either a literacy and property or income qualification or on possession of certificates of 
permanent settlement, which would be granted on proof of five years residence and a 
declaration of permanent settlement.”45     
Sinhalese leaders believed and promoted the idea that the main reason for the 
unemployment problem during the depression in the 1930s in Sri Lanka was free 
immigration from India.46 Therefore, they proposed an immigration act to control the 
flow of workers from India, but British officials were not supportive. They argued that 
free movement from India was a deep-rooted custom, and that it was essential to continue 
the plantation sector. However, with strong pressure from the Sinhalese, ultimately, the 
State Council passed the Immigration Bill of 1941. According to the bill, any person 
desiring entry to Sri Lanka must have a valid passport with visas. In addition, the Ceylon 
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Labor Union initiated negotiations with the labor contractors to decrease the Indian labor 
force in government departments. According to the new law, no non-Ceylonese were to 
be given jobs when Sinhalese were available.47 As a result, Indians, who constituted 26% 
of the government labor force in 1936, were reduced to 12% of the labor force by 1941.  
The India considered these rules of the Ceylon political leaders as clear cases of 
discrimination against the Indian community. Their opinion was that these workers had 
contributed to the development of Ceylon under the British and, hence, should have been 
recognized. Consequently, two Indo-Ceylon Relations Conferences were conducted in 
1940 and 1941, and the problem was solved in a manner that was equally beneficial for 
both countries. If India and Ceylon had been independent countries at that time, the result 
would have been different. Ceylon leaders might have instigated Indian Tamils to force 
the Indian government to intervene into these matters. As both countries were under the 
British colonization, however, such a communal uprising did not take place.    
C. NEHRUVIAN ERA: THE PERIOD OF NON-INTERVENTION 
With the withdrawal of British colonialism from the region, India sought to fill 
the power vacuum, and began to think of Sri Lanka as a factor in Indian defense, since it 
was situated at a strategically important location. The new governments of independent 
India continued the theories of British defense and security which had three main factors: 
safeguarding the Northwest frontier (now Pakistan) of India, through which invaders 
entered into India; protecting the strategic area around the sub-continent from foreign 
powers; and commanding the Indian Ocean.48 Therefore, the behavior of a new 
independent island was very important for India in formulating its defense strategies. 
With independence, Indian leaders followed a non-alignment and national self-
reliance policy, and they expected other countries in the South Asian region to follow the 
same policy. Especially, India wanted to keep the region out of non-regional power 
involvements. These policies of Indian power politics were viewed by the Sri Lankan 
leaders suspiciously even prior to independence. The first Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, 
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Mr. D. S. Senanayake, had good relations with Pandit Nehru’s government. However, he 
was not sure about the behavior of future governments of India, especially in view of 
Indo-Ceylonese divergences over the citizenship question of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
According to Sir Ivor Jennings, Mr. D S Senanayake always regarded India as the mother 
country under the leadership of Pandit Nehru. He goes on to say: “He was well aware of 
the danger implicit in having nearby a population of 350 million people pressed outward 
by a standard of living much lower than that in Ceylon and capable, under the wrong 
leadership, of becoming aggressive…”49    
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India —who strongly 
believed in Panchsheel policies50—maintained a non-aligned attitude over the power 
blocks, but he expected Sri Lanka to incline towards India’s regional power politics. 
Prime Minister Nehru himself, in 1945, pointed to the importance of unity between the 
two countries “presumably as an autonomous unit of the Indian federation.”51 He 
expected Burma and Ceylon to join that federation, but Sinhalese Buddhist elites did not 
want to join such a federation, preferring instead to maintain national sovereignty.52 
Nehru stated in his book, The Discovery of India, that “… the small state is doomed. It 
may survive as a cultural autonomous area but not as an independent political unit.”53  
Indian scholarly opinion also shows the importance of Sri Lanka to India. Indian 
writer Ramachandra Rao stated, “Ceylon is the natural focus in the Indian Ocean, and 
therefore, of its defense. It possesses unrivalled geographical advantages. Consider its 
radiating distances towards the west and East, Sri Lanka’s central in position.”54 This 
illustrates that India has had a natural interest to intervene in Sri Lankan matters. 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 39. 
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However—and more to the point of this thesis—India under Nehru did not intervene in 
Sri Lanka even though several incidents might have warranted this, because of how they 
directly affected India’s strategic and domestic concerns.  
1. Strategic Concerns and Non-Intervention during the Nehruvian Era 
Even though Pandit Nehru wanted to establish a federation inclusive of Ceylon 
and Burma after independence, he maintained a friendly policy towards Sri Lanka. 
Attending a Commonwealth foreign ministers conference in January 1950, Pandit Nehru 
said: “some people fear that the great country India might want to develop or sort of 
absorb Ceylon. I assure you that if any people have any such idea it is completely 
wrong.”55 As he promised, during his tenure India did not intervene in Sri Lanka even 
though Sri Lankan political leaders made many decisions that directly affected India’s 
strategic concerns during Nehru’s premiership.  
The Lanka-British agreement in the 1950s is an example of this. Immediately 
after independence, Sri Lanka signed a defense agreement with Great Britain to secure 
the country from possible invasions from India.56 The United National Party (UNP) 
leaders of Sri Lanka thought that this was an essential condition for Sri Lanka’s security 
considering India’s possible threat in the future. According to the agreement, the British 
were given the approval to access Sri Lanka’s naval ports and air bases with the condition 
of providing assistance to Sri Lanka in case of an emergency. In addition, Prime Minister 
D. S. Senanayake signed three bi-lateral trade agreements with Great Britain between 
1949 and 1953. By signing those agreements, Sri Lanka became the first country to act 
against India’s denial of non-regional power intervention into South Asian regional 
affairs. All sections of the parliamentary opposition were strongly critical of the UNP’s 
policy towards India. Opposition parties preferred close relations with India to closeness 
with European countries.57  India considered Sri Lanka’s closeness to Great Britain as a 
security threat to the country, and those pro-British policies of the Sri Lankan politicians 
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could be considered as a reason for engaging with a antagonist attitude in Sri Lankan 
affairs over strategic concerns.  
British involvement in Sri Lanka was strategically disadvantageous for India as 
British involvement could constrain India’s freedom of exercising hegemonic stance in 
the region. Even though the situation was strategically disadvantageous, India did not 
take any action with regard to agreements between England and Sri Lanka. However, 
India could engage antagonistically in Sri Lankan matters to counter strategic 
disadvantages by trumping Tamil issue, but India didn’t. The reason was not the 
deterrence created by the British involvement. The reason was non-availability of strong 
domestic concerns. This shows that the policies of Sri Lanka that instigated Indian 
strategic concerns were not reason enough for intervention in Sri Lanka. In other words, 
strategic concerns were not the driving factor for intervention by India at that time. 
The Sino-Indian War in October 1962 also affected Indo-Ceylon relationships 
negatively as it presented a grave strategic concern for India. With the escalation of war, 
Pandit Nehru solicited assistance from neighboring countries. By that time, Indo-Lanka 
relations were strong under the leadership of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the Prime 
Minister of Sri Lanka. However, Sri Lanka followed a neutral policy. Sri Lanka did not 
extend the support expected by Pandit Nehru, and did not declare China as an aggressor. 
In addition, Sri Lanka signed a maritime agreement with China that granted a mutual 
most-favored-nation status, as well as a commercial agreement just one year after the 
Sino-India war. Sri Lanka’s decision to favor China was due to its economic relationship. 
First, there was a rubber-rice agreement between the two countries according to which Sri 
Lanka exported more than 60% of its rubber to China and imported 40% of its rice from 
China. Second, China provided technical and economic assistance.58 India might have 
considered this incident Sri Lanka’s second act against India’s strategic concerns. Sri 
Lanka’s allowance for China to have a foot-hold in Sri Lanka directly jeopardized the 
security of India. Further, Sino-Lanka relations constrained India’s influence over Sri 
Lanka with regard to the Tamil issue. 
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Indian defense interests caused a considerable rift between the two countries. 
Since the colonial period, the Indian Ocean has been of critical strategic interest for India, 
and they had realized the fundamental importance of controlling the Indian Ocean as a 
part of their defense.59 As a result, in 1956, India extended its territorial water limits from 
three miles to six miles by Presidential Proclamation. In 1957, with another Presidential 
Proclamation, India claimed jurisdiction up to 100 nautical miles from the outer limit of 
the extended territorial water limit. The object was to acquire fisheries and other living 
resources for India. This decision was not accepted by Sri Lankan leaders, and they also 
issued a proclamation to extend the territorial limits and contiguous area up to six and 
100 nautical miles, respectively. The proclamation was purely retaliatory. In response, 
India could have exercised antagonist behavior against Sri Lanka to protect its strategic 
concerns; however, India withdrew its claim in 1958 at the meeting of the United Nations 
Commission to maintain a cordial relationship between the two countries.60   
The Kachchativu Island issue is the other example over which Indian intervention 
could have occurred. Kachchativu is a small island in the Palk Straight, and Kachchativu 
is strategically very important for both the countries since it is a good observation post 
for most of the sea between the two countries. During World War II, this island was used 
for bombardment practice. In 1949, India informed the Sri Lankan government about its 
naval exercise in the Palk Straight to take Kachchativu, a bombardment target. The 
government of Sri Lanka opposed the bombardment of Kachchative, claiming it as a part 
of Sri Lanka.61 This incident was viewed by members of the Lok Sabha, the Indian 
parliament, partly an as occupation of Indian territory by Sri Lanka. However, Pandit 
Nehru did not take further actions in this regard, as there were controversial issues 
regarding the ownership of the island. It was a great chance for India to intervene in Sri 
Lanka over strategic concerns, but India did not.  
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2. Domestic Concerns and Non-Intervention During the Nehruvian Era  
Similar to strategic concerns, domestic politics in Sri Lanka also did not provide 
enough reason for India to intervene in Sri Lanka. Some political decisions of Sri Lankan 
politicians had an impact (to a certain extent) on Tamil Nadu, which drove domestic 
concerns for intervention in Sri Lanka; however, this impact was not strong enough to 
agitate the Tamil Nadu people to strongly pressure the Indian central government to 
intervene in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan policies deprived certain rights of the Indian Tamils in 
Sri Lanka, but those policies were not life-threatening for the Tamils, although they 
created refugee problems in Tamil Nadu. Therefore, such internal policy decisions of the 
Sri Lanka government only created weak domestic concerns for India to intervene in Sri 
Lanka. Meanwhile, unfavorable domestic conditions for intervention and strong personal 
contacts between political leaders of both countries further weakened the impact of such 
domestic concerns. As a result, India did not intervene, even if weak domestic concerns 
were present. 
As in the colonial period, the citizenship was the most controversial issue that 
agitated Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. After independence, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 
1948 was passed by the Sri Lankan government. Under the act, Indian Tamils were 
granted two options to assimilate as Sri Lankan citizens: citizenship by descent and 
citizenship by registration. However, very few people were eligible to get citizenship 
under these provisions. For instance, they had to prove that they had been in Sri Lanka 
for seven years from an appointed day. People born in Sri Lanka had to prove that their 
father was Sri Lankan. In addition, many applications were rejected for clerical errors.62 
After negotiations in 1953, as part of the solution, both the Sri Lankan and Indian prime 
ministers agreed to grant Sri Lankan citizenship to 400,000 and 300,000 people, 
respectively. However, the Sri Lankan government did not implement it as negotiated. 
The government of Sri Lanka strongly believed that increasing Tamil population in Sri 
Lanka would be a threat in the future. Because of the deteriorating condition of Indians in 
Sri Lanka, the Madras Legislative Assembly passed a resolution to push the center to take 
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actions on behalf of those Indians in Sri Lanka. In addition, some South Indian  Tamils 
were ready to come to Sri Lanka to support the Sathyagraha (a non-violent protest) 
arranged against the policies of the government of Sri Lanka; however, the Indian 
government refused to provide passport facilities for them at the request of the Sri 
Lankan prime minister D. S. Senanayake. 
From the inception of Sinhalization in the 1930s, the policies of the Sinhalese hurt 
the Indian Tamils, as the main idea behind Sinhalization was to provide a higher 
percentage of Sinhalese in trade, commerce, and industrial activities. Since independence, 
the Sri Lankan governments had implemented more rigid policies to deprive Tamil 
Indians of chances for employment. Non-nationals could not enter the public or 
municipal services if Ceylonese were available, and—according to an agreement between 
the Senanayake government and the mercantile sector—clerical, technical, and 
managerial posts were given to Ceylonese wherever possible. Furthermore, the 
administration took steps to break the Indian Tamil monopoly over the import-export 
trade by imposing restrictions that were disadvantageous to Indian traders in the 1950s. 
By that time, overseas transactions were done mainly with India; therefore, Indian Tamils 
had more benefits than the Ceylonese. These policies affected a portion of the Tamil 
population, but the decision of Bandaranaike government in 1956 to recruit at least 50% 
of new recruits to the plantation sector from the Ceylonese affected many Indian Tamils. 
These activities drew the attention of Tamils in Tamil Nadu, who then pressured the 
Indian Central government through their representatives to take actions in this regard.    
In a further move to Sinhalize the country and reduce Tamil influence in the 
country, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike enacted the official language act in 1956.63 Since the 
1930s, the state had been under pressure by Buddhists to protect the religion and the 
language from colonial influence. After independence, this xenophobia was transferred to 
the Tamil population. By that time Tamils were living in seven Sinhalese provinces, and 
the Sinhalese leaders foresaw a threat to the Sinhala language. As a result, Sinhalese was 
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implemented as the only official language.64 This decision was a part of the Sinhalization 
effort to contain the India Tamil influx to Sri Lanka. Many were not Sinhala speakers. 
This then led to the break-up of the two main communal groups in Sri Lanka, and this 
decision was condemned by Sri Lankan Tamils.65 They organized Sathyagraha (a non-
violent protest) and Pada Yathra (a march on foot) to show their opposition to the new 
act.66  
3. Why Did India Not Intervene in Response to Domestic Concerns?  
The other internal and external threats to the central government during this 
period allowed little room for the Indian government to think of intervening in Sri 
Lankan matters, even though the above mentioned incidents raised Indian domestic 
concerns to a certain extent. The India-Pakistan and Sino-India wars that took place in 
1948 and 1962, respectively, destabilized the country economically and militarily. 
Therefore, India did not want to further destabilize its domestic condition by intervening 
in Sri Lankan matters. Such concerns played a considerable role in decision making.  
As far as the internal condition was concerned, this was the period in which the 
people in Tamil Nadu in India initiated their fight for autonomous powers. Parties like 
Dravida Kazhagam (DK) and Nam Tamizhar demanded not only a separate state, but for 
union of that state with the northern part of Ceylon in an independent Tamil-speaking 
unit. In 1958 when Nehru visited Madras, supporters of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
(DMK) organized demonstrations in Madras by burning copies of the Indian Constitution 
and destroying idols in Hindu temples.67 Therefore, Indian government thought that 
giving undue recognition to South Indians with regard to their demands on Sri Lankan 
Tamils would encourage Indian Tamils to struggle for an autonomous state in India in the 
future. They were in a position to ignore the demands of South Indians, as the Indian 
National Congress (INC) governed Tamil Nadu until 1967. 
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In addition to internal and external threats, the political relationship between the 
two countries also influenced non-intervention. The non-involvement policies of the 
Indian Prime Minister and his personal contacts with the leadership of Sri Lanka 
produced very strong contacts with Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the Sri Lankan prime 
minister, in 1956. Based on those personal contacts, the Sri Lankan government amended 
its new acts several times at the request of India. For example, Sri Lanka amended the 
Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 two times in 1950 and 1955 in favor of the Tamils, for 
which he was assassinated later by a Sinhalese radical. Similarly, India also followed a 
very weak stance in taking decisions against Sri Lanka. As mentioned earlier, India did 
not issue passports to Indians who were ready to come to Sri Lanka to support the 
protesters.68  Actually, India was not in a position to intervene in Sri Lanka over the 
Citizenship Act and Sinhala Only Act, as India Itself was struggling with its 
implementation of Hindi as an official language. Indian Tamils in India, won their rights 
through struggles in the 1950s. In 1917, Tamils formed the Justice Party and forced the 
British to alter this language issue. As a result, the British declared Hindi as an optional 
language in Tamil Nadu. Later, Tamil became a national language in India.69 Therefore, 
Indian leaders were not in a position to advice Sri Lankan leaders not to impose anti-
Tamil barriers.  
These activities dampened the relations of the Madras Government and the 
Central Government, but there were few consequences since both had always been 
Congress party governments since independence. Indian National Congress (INC) lost its 
power in Tamil Nadu for the first time in 1967, but INC lost its power at the central 
government in 1977 for the first time after independence. Because of this political 
connection between the center and periphery, the government of India could ignore the 
weak domestic pressure created by South Indians. 
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D. INDO-SRI LANKA RELATIONS AFTER THE NEHRUVIAN ERA 
Indian intervention in Sri Lanka during the post-Nehruvian era was shaped by two 
major factors. First, India and Sri Lanka both saw a change in their domestic, as well as 
their international strategic, scenarios. During the post-Nehruvian era, changes in the 
national and international atmosphere were not favorable for India’s intervention. 
Second, regime changes in both India and Sri Lanka directly shaped policies of 
intervention. Some contemporary leaders had cordial relationships, and they submerged 
possible causes of intervention through mutual understanding. Meanwhile, some leaders 
had adverse relationships, mostly due to personal factors, and they highlighted possible 
causes of intervention.   
1. Changes in the National and International Context and Indian 
Intervention in Sri Lanka 
Changes that took place—in the national context in particular and the 
international context in general—affected the Indo-Sri Lanka relationship during the 
post-Nehruvian era, which started in 1964. American influence in South Asia became the 
matter of highest concern, in the international context, with regard to shaping Indian 
foreign policy. After the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Americans sought naval 
facilities in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan to surround the point of crisis in 
exchange for military and economic assistance. In addition, China became a close ally of 
Pakistan after the Sino-Indian War in 1962. In addition, Pakistan’s disagreement with 
India over Kashmir and India’s assistance in creating Bangladesh had brought that 
relationship to a point of mutual hatred. Under these circumstances, India’s sense of 
security in the region was weakened. 
2. Regime Changes and Indian Intervention 
In the post-Nehruvian era, Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was shaped by the 
close personnel contacts between the prime ministers of both countries. Personal contacts 
between Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike were significant during the 
early 1970s, and contacts between Mr. Moraji Desai and Mr. J. R. Jayewardne were 
prominent during the latter part of the 1970s. However, this Indo-Sri Lankan non-
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intervention posture based on personal contacts changed in the early 1980s. During this 
period, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. J. R. Jayewardene ruled India and Sri Lanka, 
respectively. 
Under the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi and Mrs. Bandaranaike, many controversial 
issues were settled which might have led to Indian intervention. The two decided to each 
accept 75,000 stateless Indian Tamils who were not covered by the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact 
in 1964. With that pact, India accepted nearly 500,000 Tamils back into India. Even 
though the reduction of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka would lead to an increase in the 
Sinhalese nationalists’ domination over Sri Lankan Tamils, successive Indian 
governments helped Sri Lanka settle this problem in good faith. Similarly, during a 
communist insurrection led by Sinhalese radical youths, India provided helicopters, naval 
ships, and $55 million worth of military assistance in 1971.70 In 1974, Mrs. Gandhi 
acknowledged Sri Lanka’s claims over the Kachchativu island, even though there were 
speculations that the nearby sea contained deposits of oil.71   
In 1977, Moraji Desai and J. R. Jayewardene were elected prime ministers of 
India and Sri Lanka, respectively. They had a close friendship. Therefore, there was also 
no Indian intervention in Sri Lanka during this period. Both of these leaders had common 
characteristics. They showed strong opposition to the actions of their predecessors, and 
that stance automatically brought them close to each other. Desai had a different ideology 
compared to Nehru and Indira Gandhi.72 Similarly, Jayewardene also had a different 
ideology from Mrs. Bandaranaike. When communal riots occurred in July-August 1977, 
protests in Tamil Nadu pressured the Indian government to settle the problem by 
intervention. Responding promptly, Desai sent a representative, Mr. S. A. Chidanbaram, 
to Sri Lanka to look into the problem. After an inquiry, he reported to Desai that the riots 
were internal in nature and that Indian intervention was not required. Therefore, India did 
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not intervene. This was a classic example of how India’s policy of intervention was 
shaped by personal contacts. 
Desai’s tenure terminated with the re-election of Indira Gandhi as the new prime 
minister of India in 1980. Thereafter, Indo-Lankan relationships were not as friendly as 
they had been previously due to rifts between the leaders.73 During Gandhi’s previous 
tenure, Sirimavo Bandaranaike was her closest friend. When Jayewardene became the 
president, he stripped away Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s civil rights for seven years. 
Jayewardene portrayed that act as a victory for democracy. Gandhi condemned this act 
and publicly announced how the UNP government had mistreated her friend in Sri 
Lanka.74 Another reason for the break between the two leaders occurred in 1977 when 
Jayewardene visited India for the first time after becoming president. He publicly 
described how Gandhi and Bandaranaike harassed opposition leaders during their tenure. 
Gandhi did not tolerate this behavior from the president of a neighboring country, and she 
referred to Jayewardene and Desai as two old foxes.75  
This interpersonal hostility led India to be more sensitive to the Tamil Sinhala rift 
in Sri Lanka. Meantime, the policies of Jayewardene that affected the regional hegemonic 
power of India further broadened the rift between them. This dissonance at the inter-
personal level did not considerably affect Indian policy towards Sri Lanka in the short-
run, but it did encourage Indira Gandhi to intervene in Sri Lanka when there was 
domestic pressure on her government in 1983.  
3. Strategic Concerns and Non-Intervention In the 1970s and Early 
1980s 
Similar to the Nehruvian era, decisions of the Sri Lankan governments in the post-
Nehruvian era affected the strategic concerns of India at a higher level. During this period 
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regional instability grew due to non-regional power interventions that India had not 
tolerated since its independence. Disregarding that policy, Sri Lankan governments 
allowed non-regional powers to enter into the region in various ways. 
During this period, Indian security was threatened by tension between the two 
superpowers. Both the USSR and the U.S. were keen on taking part in disputes in the 
South Asian region. Both the U.S. and China kept good relations with Pakistan while 
India depended on the Soviet Union. During this era, India understood the importance of 
Sri Lanka in protecting India’s geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean, as some Sri 
Lankan policies created situations that India did not like.76  
Radical and comprehensive economic reforms that were introduced by 
Jayewardene worsened Indo-Sri Lanka relations, as they opened doors for non-regional 
countries to interfere in regional matters that challenged India’s regional hegemony.77 He 
wanted to develop Sri Lanka rapidly in an open economic system and collaborated with 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This new open market economy 
required appropriate infrastructure in the country. Hence, Sri Lanka had to depend on 
Western donors like the U.S., UK, Canada, and West Germany, to name a few, without 
considering India’s opposition to non-regional interference in the South Asian region.78 
In addition, Jayewardene made many decisions that were against the Indian strategic 
design: he attempted to join Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), allowing 
South East Asian countries to participate in South Asian affairs; he allowed Western 
countries to establish companies in Sri Lanka with the intention of increasing Western 
trade relations;79 he condemned the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, knowing India’s 
close relationship with the Soviet Union; furthermore, he instructed Sri Lankan diplomats 
in the UN to take the Pro-U.S. side when the matter was discussed. 
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While having a pro-Western policy of economic reforms, Mr. Jayewardene 
established military connections with Western countries.80 With the emergence of a 
militant Tamil group, he involved Great Britain in Sri Lankan matters—as with the 
British-Ceylon Defense Pact signed in 1947. His idea was to contain the Indian 
hegemonic attitude by being friendly with Western countries, but Britain did not support 
Sri Lanka as Mr. Jayewardene expected. However, Air Service Commandos from Britain 
and intelligence service members from Israel came to Sri Lanka to train military forces. 
Furthermore, he gave consent to establish a powerful Voice of America station in Sri 
Lanka to monitor intelligence activities in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, he 
permitted U.S. naval vessels to enter Sri Lankan harbors for recreation and refueling.81 
He allowed U.S. companies to develop Tank Farm Project in Trincomalee in Sri Lanka. It 
could be used as a mass fuel storage facility for ships sailing in the Indian Ocean. Where 
Sino-Sri Lanka relations are concerned, the Chinese relationship with Sri Lankan 
government was strong during this period as Sri Lanka did not side with India during the 
Sino-Indian War in 1962. In return, China ironically helped to suppress a communist 
movement in Sri Lanka in 1971 by providing five gun-boats to the Sri Lanka navy to 
safeguard the country.82 
However, in spite of these strategic reasons to intervene in Sri Lankan matters, 
India still maintained a friendly environment between the two countries. India did not 
allow the destabilization of Sri Lanka at any cost. The best example was India’s 
assistance in the suppression of the communist uprising in 1971. When Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP), a communist political party, started to topple the government, Mrs. 
Bandaranaike requested assistance from many countries including the U.S., the UK, 
Pakistan, and India. India, responding more quickly than the other countries, sent five 
frigates to seal off Colombo harbor and 150 troops to protect Katunayake international 
airport. In addition, India provided five helicopters and equipment for 5000 troops to 
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control further expansion of the insurgency. . India did all these things to help to maintain 
stability of Sri Lanka under the request of the government of Sri Lanka. Therefore, these 
activities do not come under the category of intervention. Actually, this was a good 
chance for India to let Sri Lanka destabilize. However, even though the policies of Sri 
Lankan government badly affected India’s strategic interests in the region, India extended 
its assistance to Sri Lanka. This clearly indicates that strategic concerns did not drive 
India’s policy of intervention in Sri Lanka.  
4. Domestic Concerns and Non-Intervention in the 1970s and  early 
1980s 
Similar to the Nehruvian era, decisions of the Sri Lankan governments in the post-
Nehruvian era affected the domestic concerns of India, but did not rise to a level that 
instigated the Indian central government to make a decision to intervene. Many Sri 
Lankan political decisions during the 1970s and the early 1980s were a continuation of 
decisions made by previous governments. These internal political decisions of Sri Lanka 
had an impact on the Tamil Nadu people over communal affinities, but their pressure on 
the Indian central government was weak. Therefore, India did not take any action 
stronger than exchanging diplomatic arguments between two countries. The destabilized 
domestic situation in India, which was unfavorable for intervention, and the bilateral 
model in foreign politics, further weakened those weak domestic concerns. 
Even though Sirimavo Bandaranaike maintained a friendly relationship with 
Indian political leaders, she did not take precautions to minimize Tamil issues in Sri 
Lanka that affected the Indian government, even to a minimal extent. She established a 
new republic constitution in 1972. This constitution guaranteed pre-eminence for the 
Sinhalese language and favored Buddhism over other religions in the country.83 She also 
accepted Sinhala as the official language. Therefore, Tamils protested against this 
constitution, and they demanded a separate autonomous state for themselves, as they had 
prior to the Portuguese invasion in 1505. Later, as Jayarathnam Wilson states, 
Bandaranaike changed the university entrance system to favor Sinhalese by introducing a 
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district-based quota system.84According to that system, the number of students who 
could enter universities from any one district was limited—and since Tamils were in 
seven out of 25 districts in Sri Lanka, the number of Tamil students who were eligible to 
enter universities was reduced.  
President Jayewardene, who created many strategic concerns that encouraged 
India to intervene, also created issues that encouraged domestic concerns. Knowing the 
possible “spillover effect” which might create problems for the central government of 
India, he did not pay attention to the Tamil issue, which was turning into a military 
struggle in the North.85 In fact, his policies of controlling Tamils further escalated the 
militant struggle in Sri Lanka. For instance, he introduced a new constitution in 1978 
which accepted various fundamental rights, subject to limitations. That was an ethnically 
impartial document. According to Neil De Votta, “it maintained the state’s unitary 
structure, thereby ensuring that Tamils would continue to occupy a subservient position 
in their relations with all subsequent Sinhalese governments.”86 Furthermore, he 
introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979. With that act security forces 
could arrest and detain Tamil youths up to eight months.87  
5. Why Did India Not Intervene in Response to Domestic Concerns?   
 The domestic situation in India did not favor Indian intervention in Sri Lankan 
matters during the post-Nehruvian era. The Kashmir issue remained unsolved. In 
addition, a war with Pakistan in 1965 and Indian assistance in creating a separate state for 
East Pakistanis destabilized India economically, militarily, and politically. Through 1974, 
there was a series of processions and strikes in Bihar to resign the congress 
government.88 Later in June, 1975, India Gandhi imposed a state of emergency in India 
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to quell the opposition against deepening political and economic problems.89 In addition, 
caste-based violence, communal tensions, corruption, coalition politics, and an absence of 
the rule of law also directly and indirectly contributed to instability in India. All these 
issues created tension between the Indian center and its periphery. 
In this domestic environment, India was not in a position to hear Tamil Nadu 
slogans in support of Sri Lankan Tamils, who were struggling militarily for a separate 
and independant state in Sri Lanka. Therefore, India thought it would not be advisable to 
support a separation concept in Sri Lanka, for fear of a spillover effect.90 Indian 
assistance to the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka would have been a cause for many states 
in India to fight for separate states. Tamil Nadu was at the top of the list in this regard, as 
they were keeping close contacts with military groups in Sri Lanka. For example, the 
DMK had contacts with the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), while 
AIADMK had contacts with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Actually, the 
case in Sri Lanka was the main issue in Tamil Nadu politics during this period. 
Considering this growing situation, Gandhi ousted ethno-nationalist parties that 
destabilized her government at the center.91   
 Second, India was concerned about its destabilized and insecure condition more 
than anything else during the post-Nehruvian era. Therefore, political leaders adopted 
bilateral relations with neighboring countries. Under that concept, three policy goals were 
involved: “first there was the need to sustain and broaden areas of agreements with 
smaller neighbors through confidence building measures; second, to adopt an assertive 
regional stance that would emphasize the parameters of foreign policy autonomy and 
ensure the negation of perusing policies anathema to Indian politics; third, to minimize 
the presence and/or influence of external powers in the region.”92 This practice led the 
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Indian government not to intervene in Sri Lankan matters, even though there was weak 
political pressure from South Indian states to do so. In addition, the central government 
minimized the possible causes in Sri Lanka that might instigate Tamil Nadu. Providing 
Indian citizenship for some stateless  Tamils  and accepting Sri Lanka’s claims over 
Kachchativu Island were examples of this. According to Indian political scientists, 
“bilateralism increasingly became the preferred model adopted by India in its relation 
with neighboring states after 1971 from its position of growing regional dominance.”93 
To strengthen bi-lateral connections, in 1968 a Joint Indo-Ceylonese Tea Consortium was 
formed to negotiate a better international price for tea. One year later, a Joint Committee 
on Economic Cooperation and Joint Standing Committee on Tea were formed.94  
Prominent political figures in India also minimized Indian intervention in Sri 
Lanka. Relations between Mrs. Bandaranaike and Mrs. Gandhi, and between 
Jayewardene and Desai, were prominent. The best example of this is the way Prime 
Minister Desai responded to Tamil politicians in 1977 when they requested intervention 
in Sri Lanka to stop anti-Tamil riots. Responding positively, Desai sent a representative 
to Sri Lanka to inquire into the incident, after which he informed politicians in Tamil 
Nadu that the issue was internal in nature and contained no Indian dimension.95 
However, no good deed goes unpunished. He was defeated during the next election in 
1980.   
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III. INTERVENTION IN SRI LANKA AND INDIAN DOMESTIC 
DYNAMICS SUPPORTING FOR INTERVENTION 
India turned to an interventionist phase in the 1980s, changing its friendlier 
attitude discussed in Chapter II. This interventionist attitude lasted for almost a decade 
until the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE suicide bomber in 
1991. Changes in the international situation during this period were disadvantageous for 
India to have an interventionist attitude towards Sri Lanka. Still, Indian governments 
continued with their interventionist policy. The initiation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka 
did not create a considerable impact on India’s strategic interests in Sri Lanka, which led 
to an intervention. If there was no strategic setting behind the Indian intervention, some 
significant reason must have strongly affected the attitudinal change of India towards Sri 
Lanka. 
In Indo-Lanka post-independence history, there were two significant incidents 
that paved the way for Indian intervenion in Sri Lanka. The first incident was the anti-
Tamil riots in Sri Lanka in 1983, and the second was the Sri Lankan government’s 
massive military offensive to liberate Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE in 1987. 
Immediately after both of these incidents, India unexpectedly demonstrated an 
interventionist attitude. In Indo-Sri Lankan post-independence history, these two 
occasions are the most significant Indian interventions in Sri Lankan affairs. These 
interventions negatively affected the cordial Indo-Lanka relations that had a long history 
and drastically affected the length of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. This interventionist 
behavior leads to a question about why India changed its cordial attitude—an attitude that 
was obvious prior to the initiation of ethnic conflict—towards Sri Lanka, and so 
drastically within a short span of time. What was the impetus behind the sudden policy 
change towards Sri Lanka?  
This is the question discussed in this chapter, based on the hypothesis that India 
was compelled to intervene in Sri Lanka due to strong domestic concerns. The first 
section provides background details of India’s situation in the region prior to its 
intervention. It describes how India’s diversified society, Cold War changes in the 
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international context, and India’s historically interventionist stance in the region made a 
complex situation in terms of intervention in Sri Lanka. It shows that intervention was 
disadvantageous for India, unless there was a significant and unavoidable concern.  
The second section addresses the first concrete foundation of India’s domestic 
setting for intervention in 1983. It describes the domestic drive for intervention based on 
Tamil Nadu pressure, and how India was compelled to intervene because of various 
domestic concerns. Furthermore, the section addresses India’s dual policy in order to 
reveal how India’s main drive behind the intervention was fueled primarily by domestic 
interests.  
The third section addresses the second concrete foundation laid by Sri Lankans 
for Indian intervention in 1987. This section shows how India’s stand-offish policy 
towards Sri Lanka changed into an interventionist attitude based on domestic concerns. 
Furthermore, it describes how Indians sought to use the Sri Lankan problem to ease 
Tamil Nadu pressure on the Indian central government.  
A. PRELUDE TO THE INTERVENTIONIST PHASE 
India is the central country bordering almost every other country in the region, 
and this geographical connection has produced a complex ethno-political situation. 
Changes in the political, military, and economic policies of India considerably affect the 
survival of other countries in the region, as India is the predominant power in regional 
dynamics. Similarly, changes made by other regional countries  also affect the domestic 
policy decisions of India. As a result, India always monitors the economic, political, and 
military policies of neighboring countries. 
India’s vastness presents a significant diversity in terms of culture, politics, and 
economics. Therefore, unlike other regional countries, maintaining the country’s unity 
had been the most challenging task of Indian governments since independence. In 
addition, since there were many religious, communal, and cultural affinities with the 
people of neighboring countries, the India and others were very sensitive about activities 
in the region. Therefore, Indian governments promptly attended any internal and external 
problems that had implications for India. They did not hesitate to take either reasonable 
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or unreasonable measures against neighbors to maintain a peaceful environment in India. 
In fact, the drive of Indian foreign policy decisions was considerably shaped by the 
prioritization of domestic stability. 
As far as Indo-Sri Lankan relations are concerned, non-regional power 
involvements in the South Asian region during the Cold War prompted India to intervene 
in the Sri Lankan conflict. India’s inclination towards the Soviet bloc, unhealthy relations 
with the U.S., its long-standing interstate rivalry with Pakistan, and border disputes with 
China affected the regional power politics of India and limited India’s interventionist 
behavior in Sri Lanka. Similarly, India’s records of clandestine assistance to insurgent 
groups to fight against legitimate governments in the region, which had drawn 
international concern, affected India’s decision making in the Sri Lankan conflict. In this 
light, intervention in Sri Lanka was not strategically beneficial for India. 
Even though India was careful to isolate regional conflicts from outsiders, 
changes in the international context at the end of the 1970s and early years of the 1980s 
conversely affected Indian strategy. Regional conflicts facilitated non-regional countries 
to intervene in South Asian affairs, and such interventions degraded India’s influence in 
regional matters. Some involvements of strong countries indirectly and directly affected 
Indian security, and some involvements reduced the probability of Indian intervention in 
regional conflicts. For instance Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 facilitated United 
States to involve in the conflict, and it reduced the probability of Indian intervention to 
solve the matter, and “with the intense war situation in Afghanistan and consolidation of 
relations among Pakistan, the U.S., China, and Saudi Arabia over the Afghanistan crisis. 
India’s regional context appeared to be more and more insecure.”96 
After India’s independence, various U.S. administrations considered India a 
potential front against the Soviet Union and provided economic assistance to achieve the 
United States’ strategic interests in the South Asian region. However, India tilted towards 
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the Soviet block after the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, ending its policy of neutrality.97 As 
a result, Indo-U.S. relations became frosty. At the end of 1970s, with the Soviet invasion 
in Afghanistan, the U.S. paid scant attention to the South Asian region. The U.S. initiated 
a strategic relationship with Pakistan immediately after the invasion with the intention of 
utilizing Pakistan to contain the spread of communism in the region.98 U.S.-Pakistan 
relations directly affected India’s hegemonic stance in the South Asian region. 
However, India was less concerned with U.S. proxy war in Afghanistan then with 
the Chinese involvement in the region. After the Sino-India border war in 1962, India had 
to keep an eye on two enemies, one on each side. As far as the China-Pakistan 
relationship was concerned, China provided conventional military ware to Pakistan to 
fight in Kashmir against Indian forces.99 When India acquired nuclear power capability, 
China provided covert nuclear technology assistance to counter the power imbalance in 
the region.100 Therefore, China-Pakistan relations also directly affected India’s 
hegemonic stance in the region. Given this circumstance, India’s intervention in Sri 
Lanka was strategically disadvantageous for India, since both the U.S. and China were 
concerned about Sri Lanka for their own strategic interests. 
The deep- rooted Chinese relationship with Sri Lanka made India’s intervention 
strategically disadvantageous. Starting with the Rubber Rice agreement in 1952,101  
China provided economic and military assistance to Sri Lanka, since the strategic 
location of Sri Lanka was very important for China in protecting its sea lanes of 
communication. Growing American power in the region and an Indian hegemonic stance 
were seen by the Chinese as threats to its energy supply route, which lies in the Indian 
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Ocean. Therefore, the Chinese preferred to maintain a favorable regime in Sri Lanka. 
During the 1970s, the Chinese government provided five gun boats to the Sri Lanka navy 
with the intention of securing its energy route. After the emergence of the ethnic conflict, 
Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Zi Yang promised to stand with Sri Lanka in protecting its 
territorial integrity.102 
The history of Indian intervention in the internal matters of regional countries also 
came into play regarding India’s intervention decisions in Sri Lanka. For Instance, 
Pakistan accused India in international forums of fomenting political violence in the 
southern Pakistan province of Sindh. Since 1983, a Sindh coalition has been launching 
violent disturbances against the Pakistan central government, demanding greater 
provincial autonomy.103 Pakistan accused India of inciting violence in the region. 
Similarly, Pakistan accused India in 1971 of supporting the “Mukthi Bahini” group which 
struggled for an independent Bangladesh. Indian support for the creation of Bangladesh 
was obvious to the international community.104 With this history intervention in Sri 
Lanka in support of Tamil Tigers (LTTE) was further tarnishing India’s image. Yet India 
chose to intervene in Sri Lanka in the 1980s to first support the LTTE and then to 
eradicate them. 
In this international context, intervention in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in 
support of the Tamil tigers was not advisable for India for three reasons. First, India was 
an ally of Russia, and there was a chance that the U.S. might extend its assistance to Sri 
Lanka. The U.S. naval fleet wanted a back-up facility if it had to withdraw from in the 
Philippines. Second, Pakistan and Sri Lanka had a cordial relationship during the 1980s. 
Pakistani president Zia-ul-Haq presented Pakistan’s highest civilian honor, “Nishan-E-
Pakistan,” to Jayewardene when he visited Pakistan in March 1985, and reiterated 
Prsident Haq’s support for the Sinhalese war against the Tamil Tigers. He also donated 
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one million rupees to Sri Lanka as a gesture of Pakistani assistance.105 Third, Indian 
intervention might escalate the situation and pave a way for China to mediate the problem 
and secure China’s Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean. In such 
a circumstance, another undesirable entanglement in Sri Lanka was disadvantageous for 
India, since supporting insurgents might encourage the government of Sri Lanka to join 
with non-regional nations for their safety. President Jayewardene said that he would 
accept assistance—even from the devil—to eradicate terrorism from Sri Lanka. 
Therefore, non-intervention was the most beneficial decision for India during the Cold 
War era.  
Even though, the situation in the international context did not favor India’s 
intervention, India could not ignore the domestic pressure. India unexpectedly intervened 
in the Sri Lankan internal conflict in 1983 and 1987. The governing party at the center, 
that is Indian National Congress (INC), did not want to lose its power at the center by 
making decisions based on international ramifications. Therefore, the domestic concerns 
of India played a major role in its intervention in Sri Lankan matters. 
B. TAMIL NADU: THE SOURCE OF INDIAN DOMESTIC SETTING FOR 
INTERVENTION IN SRI LANKA 
Tamil Nadu is the southernmost state in India, as well as the eleventh largest state 
in geographical size and the seventh most-populated state in India.106 Tamil Nadu is the 
home for Tamils, and most of them are Hindus. Most area in Tamil Nadu comes under 
rural position, and many people in these areas engage in agricultural sector activities.107 
This situation remained same in the 1980s. Under this light, Tamil Nadu politicians could 
easily mobilize these people to pressure the central government to act in favor of Tamils 
in Sri Lanka. Mobilization was easy because of the high literacy rate in the state.  
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Tamil Nadu has been problematic for the central government since the colonial 
period. This situation began with the emergence of a drive among the Tamils for their 
own separate state in 1960s. Viewing Brahmin domination in government, professional, 
and educational sectors in the Tamil Nadu Presidency as discrimination, Tamils formed 
the South Indian People’s Association in 1916 to protect their rights. However, there 
were Brahmins in Tamil Nadu, but their percentage was very little compared to other 
casts. For instance, Brahmin percentage in Tamil Nadu was one in 2007.108  Mohan Ram 
states that “the group’s manifesto was an attempt at checkmating the challenge to 
Brahmin interests implicit in the support by Brahmins all over India to the Congress 
party’s demand for Home Rule.”109 With the foundation of the Justice Party in 1917, 
Tamils managed to win non-Brahmin representation in the Madras Presidency and 
obtained the consent of the British to demarcate a separate country for them before the 
British left India,110 but later joined Gandhi in supporting the independence movement in 
return for a Tamil statehood. 
The Tamils’ inert drive to have a separate country was not abandoned after the 
independence of India. They destroyed Hindi idols and burnt copies of the Indian 
Constitution to demonstrate their rejection of Hindu as the official language when Nehru 
visited Madras in 1958. The hidden agenda behind these activities was to have a separate 
autonomous country for the Tamils.111  
Clearly understanding the future threat, Nehru introduced the Sixteenth 
Amendment to the Indian Constitution. According to that amendment, all politicians had 
to promise to protect the sovereignty and integrity of India.112 Since then, any act that 
supports secessionism has been considered an illegal act. Therefore, Tamil politicians 
could not overtly support creation of a separate country in India, but they still covertly 
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had that desire.113 When Sri Lankan Tamils started to struggle for a separate country in 
Sri Lanka, Indian Tamils in India supported them as ethnic brethren. They started to 
pressure the central government of India in favor of Sri Lankan Tamils. As Indian leaders 
did not want to lose South Indian votes, they had to intervene in the Sri Lankan ethnic 
conflict, as desired by domestic Tamils. According to Neville Ladduwahetty, “Tamil 
Nadu was the determining factor in shaping India’s relations with Sri Lanka.”114 
Venkatesh Rao states, “Policy makers in New Delhi were considerably influenced by the 
political dynamics in Tamil Nadu in dealing with the Sri Lanka ethnic problem.”115 
Therefore, Tamil Nadu pressure was the prominent domestic concern of India affecting 
its intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s.       
C. FIRST TURNING POINT: ANTI-TAMIL RIOTS IN 1983 
Anti-Tamil riots, which took place in July, 1983, were the concrete domestic 
events that triggered the Indian intervention. Those riots created millions of sympathizers 
all over the world and agitated the Tamil Nadu people, in particular, to overtly support 
Tamil militant groups fighting for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. As a result of the 
riots, fighting for Tamil rights was accepted as a legitimate and reasonable activity. 
Sinhalese actions were condemned by many regional and non-regional countries, and 
Indo-Lanka relations deteriorated within a short span of time because of growing pressure 
from the Tamil Nadu people. The Government of India was compelled to get actions to 
settle the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka as soon as possible. 
Anti-Tamil riots on July 23, 1983 were the result of the killing of 13 soldiers of 
the Sri Lankan army, on a patrol close to Jaffna University, by the LTTE.116 By that 
time, the Sinhalese-Tamil relationship was tense, since Tamil militants had started to 
attack isolated army camps and police stations in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. 
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However, this was the first time that Tamil militants had killed 13 soldiers in one attack. 
Knowing the possible agitation in the South, the Sri Lankan government decided to 
cremate the dead soldiers somewhere in the North, but relatives strongly opposed that 
decision. Then, the government decided to cremate the soldiers in Colombo, silently, 
since sending bodies to villages would possibly spread escalation throughout the country. 
The plan did not work as expected and funeral had to be cancelled because of delayed 
arrival of bodies to Colombo on July 24, 1983. This incident agitated thousands of 
Sinhalese gathered to pay last respects. They started to attack Tamils in Colombo.117  
The Sinhalese attack on Tamils was well organized, and it quickly spread all over 
the Colombo suburbs. The police were not in a position to control such a huge and 
violent public gathering. The army was called to normalize the situation, but even the 
army failed to curtail the violence. Meanwhile, the violence spread to predominant Tamil 
areas in the country. On July 25, fifty two Tamil militants—who were in the Welikada 
prison—were clubbed to death by Sinhalese prisoners. In the end, 3000 innocent Tamil 
people were killed and property worth an estimated Rs.150 billion was destroyed, many 
of them were Tamil businesses.118 In addition, 200,000 to 250,000 Tamils became 
refugees as a consequence of the riots, and most of them later migrated to India, Europe, 
and North America.119   
1.  Tamil Nadu Reaction: Domestic Drive to Intervene 
The Anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka became the leading topic of South Indian 
politics, and Tamil politicians competed to support Tamil groups in order to gain political 
benefits. Both the DMK and AIADMK parties organized mass demonstrations, strikes, 
protest rallies, and sathyagraha by taking Tamils to the streets. Some demonstrators 
immolated themselves. Meanwhile, an all-party delegation of 16 members met Indira 
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Gandhi and urged her to mediate the problem by sending Indian troops or a UN peace-
keeping force to protect the Tamils. Karunanidhi, the DMK leader, warned the central 
government that he would resign his seat in the assembly if the Indian government did 
not act against the Sri Lankan government. The DMK pressured the central government 
to suspend diplomatic relations, impose economic sanctions, and expel Sri Lanka from 
the Non- Aligned Movement.120 Furthermore, he got 100,000 signatures to send to the 
UN Secretary General calling for a stop to the genocide in Sri Lanka.121  
Similarly, M. G. Ramachandran, the leader of AIADMK, expressed the opinion 
that his party would not contest the by-elections to Purasawalkam and Annanagar 
constituencies if the Indian government did not get involved in the situation. He had a 
duplicitous policy. He was close to Congress (I) and accepted Gandhi’s stance of the 
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. However, at the same time, he supported the LTTE in 
forming a separate country in Sri Lanka.122 Ramachandran and Karunanidhi posed for 
photographs with insurgent leaders to show their assistance in maintaining the separatist 
struggle in Sri Lanka. In general, South Indian politicians urged the Indian government to 
support the separatist Tamil movement—as they had for the movement which created 
Bangladesh in 1971.123 
Overtly expressing sentiments in favor of Tamil insurgents, Tamil Nadu 
politicians strengthened the Tamil militants militarily and financially after the anti-Tamil 
riots. South Indian politicians allowed Tamil militant groups to freely move in the state. 
Sri Lankan Tamil militant leaders who were in Tamil Nadu were given armed 
bodyguards and escort cars to ensure their safety. Both police and custom officers in the 
state were instructed to pay some respect to these groups and not disrupt their 
activities.124 Tamil groups, especially the LTTE, were allowed to establish arms factories 
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in Coimbatore which manufactured guns and explosives. Meanwhile, factories in Mysore 
and Bangalore produced military boots and spare parts for AK-47 rifles. Some factories 
made 5000 grenades a day for Tamil groups.125 Furthermore, they were allowed to 
purchase explosives from Kerala, Orissa, and Karnataka with the blessings of South 
Indian politicians.126  
2. India’s Intervention: A Compulsory Act Based on Internal Concerns 
Considering the increasingly tense domestic situation in Tamil Nadu, Prime 
Minister India Gandhi initially thought to terminate the problem by negotiating with her 
ally, M G Ramachandran, of AIDMK. If India had any pre-determined interest in 
intervening in Sri Lankan affairs, this was the best chance to do so, but she asked 
Ramachandran to stop his assistance to Sri Lankan Tamil militants and to stabilize the 
state without making troubles for the central government. Ramachandran said that he 
could not control the urge of the Tamil Nadu people to support militant groups. 
Furthermore, he said that as his opponent, the DMK leader Karunanidi, was mobilizing 
people with this issue, not supporting the people’s desire at this stage would badly affect 
his political career. 
Indira Gandhi was in a dilemma with regard to Tamil Nadu’s activities in Sri 
Lanka. She needed to remove Ramachandran, since he opposed stopping assistance to 
militants, and she wanted to control Tamil Nadu military assistance to militia groups in 
Sri Lanka. However, she could not do either of these things. Gandhi could not remove 
Ramachandran since she was heavily dependent on him to preserve power for the central 
government. He had been an electoral ally of the Congress (I) Party since his victory in 
1977. Similarly, she could not move against the Tamil Nadu people since they helped to 
retain Indira’s power at the center when she lost her power in the North in the 1977 
elections. In return, she had offered prominent civil service positions and important posts 
to South-Indian Tamils. For these reasons, she needed to take some sort of action against 
Sri Lanka, even though she was reluctant to do so. 
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In that light, the only option that Indira had was to persuade the Sri Lankan 
president to solve the problem with militant groups through negotiation. By that time, she 
had realized the possible future ramifications and threats for India due to the growing Sri 
Lankan issue. Specifically, Gandhi did not want Tamil militants to win a separate state in 
Sri Lanka, since such victory would instigate the Tamil Nadu people to fulfill their long-
held desire for a state in India. Therefore, she needed to settle the problem in a peaceful 
manner, without aggravating it. According to J N Dixit, “there was a perception that if 
India did not support the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka and if the government of India tried to 
question the political and emotional feelings of Tamil Nadu, there would be resurgence of 
Tamil separatism in India.”127 Unfortunately, this option was also not available for 
Gandhi, as the Sri Lankan president preferred a military solution to a peaceful one. He 
correctly believed that Mrs. Gandhi was acting under pressure from Tamils in Tamil 
Nadu. Domestic concerns were setting the stage for India to intervene in Sri Lanka. 
Gandhi’s interest in Sri Lanka was driven by her domestic need to keep Tamil 
Nadu’s support for her party. In a statement to the Indian parliament on August 5, 1983, 
she said, “India does not pose any threat to Sri Lanka nor do we want to interfere in Sri 
Lankan affairs. We want the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka to be preserved.”128 P. 
Venkateshwar Rao states, “Policy makers in New Delhi were considerably influenced by 
the political dynamics in Tamil Nadu in dealing with the Sri Lankan ethnic problem.”129 
These were the circumstances under which Gandhi had to shape and decide Indian policy 
towards Sri Lanka.   
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3. India’s Dual Policy 
Considering these factors, ultimately, India launched a two-pronged strategy 
which had an overt political, and a covert military, approach to settle the issue.130 
Through the overt approach, Indian government proposed power sharing to accommodate 
the militants’ demands, but not a separate state. However, India allowed the militants to 
believe that India would take all possible measures to achieve their desires. Through the 
covert approach, Indian government supported militant groups in Sri Lanka to please 
Tamils in Tamil Nadu, in order to preserve the INC’s southern political front. This 
approach was known only by Tamil militants in Sri Lanka and pro-LTTE factions in 
Tamil Nadu. It was covert to rest of the world. In exercising this approach, Indian 
political leaders were careful to provide financial and military assistance via Tamil Nadu 
politicians. 
a. Political Approach 
India utilized its political approach to convince the world of its responsible 
behavior in the region as the regional superpower. With the creation of Bangladesh in 
1971, India became more concerned about establishing its hegemonic stance in the South 
Asian region. In addition to its leading economy and possession of resources, India 
increased its military, naval, and nuclear power to strengthen its hegemonic position. The 
situation in Sri Lanka in 1983 was a good chance for India to signal its leading role to 
other countries in the region. To mark India’s responsible behavior, Indira Gandhi 
expressed her deep concerns while addressing the United Nations Correspondents 
Association in September 1983.131 
India also required a peaceful solution in order to maintain its economic 
interests. Since 1947, India had a steadily increasing population, but it had experienced 
agricultural stagnation in the 1960s and 1970s. India had domestic problems in three 
fields which hindered economic growth: aid, trade, and foreign investment. Meanwhile, 
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India wanted to develop its economy with the least negative impact on its political and 
economic independence. These economic policies directly related to the non-aligned 
foreign policy of post-independent India. However, Indian government had to shift 
India’s fundamental policies to be on par with the developing global economic system. 
Especially after the Sino-Indian War, many Indian governments realized that non-
alignment and the self-help system did not match well with the prevailing global system.  
To achieve this economic development, India had to establish extensive 
contacts outside the South Indian region to establish investors and to maintain a healthy 
market for productions. In pursuit of that goal, India established new economic contacts 
with European Community and Western countries in the 1980s. India systematically 
diversified its patterns of trade, both in terms of commodities traded and trading partners. 
Similarly, India obtained aid from various sources to develop infrastructure facilities. 
However, India always attempted to diversify its economic partners, as it did not want to 
keep its economic system dependent upon just a few countries. Indira Gandhi said, “No 
country should even think of using aid to make India change its fundamental policies. If 
any country has such ideas, it is nurturing wrong notions.”132 
After her death, her son Rajiv Gandhi strengthened that step with free 
market policies. It was a less-rigidly structured and less-tightly controlled framework. 
With this new economic policy, India ranked 13th in terms of total value-added in 
manufacturing. India was 15th in 1971.133 
Considering all of these factors, in August Indira Gandhi appointed G. 
Parthasarathy, an experienced diplomat, as special envoy and mediator to settle the 
dispute.134 His main function was to get all concerned parties in Sri Lanka to the 
negotiating table and find a political solution for the dispute. As there was a general 
election in 1984, Indira Gandhi wanted to settle this problem before it affected her 
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election campaign. Parthasarathy met with the concerned parties and made a proposal to 
form North and East councils by uniting existing district councils.135 Later, Indira 
Gandhi proposed merging the North and East provinces and making one province as per 
the demand of Tamils in Sri Lanka. She wanted to settle the problem in the quickest way 
possible to remove domestic pressure. However, the Sri Lankan president did not agree 
with the proposal, claiming that a decision should be taken by an All Party Conference 
(APC).136 Therefore, an APC was held in January 1984, but the participants rejected the 
merging of provinces..  
b. Military Approach 
Under these circumstances, the Gandhi government had to acquiesce and 
cooperate with Tamil Nadu’s activities in order to alleviate domestic pressure.137 That 
was the only course of action available please Tamils in India. Therefore, the Research 
and Analysis Wing (RAW) was entrusted with providing military support for Tamil 
youths.138 However, her strategy was “to use the military to harass Colombo only to the 
extent of forcing it to reach an agreement acceptable to New Delhi.”139 According to 
Vinod Khobragade, Gandhi wanted “to provide support to the Sri Lankan Tamils to 
generate sufficient pressure on the Sri Lankan government to make it responsive to Tamil 
operations so that Sri Lanka [did] not disintegrate.”140 
After RAW engaged in training, three new training camps were opened in 
Chakrata near Dehra Dun in Uththara Pradesh, at Ramakrishnapuram in New Delhi and 
at a location near the Delhi International Airport141 In addition, eight camps in North 
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India and 35 training camps in Tamil Nadu were established with the blessings of RAW. 
Retired Indian army officers were hired for the military training, and weapons were 
provided by RAW. Many militant groups were trained in these camps, but these groups 
were not trained together. Meanwhile, various politicians backed different groups. For 
instance, Ramachandran preferred the LTTE, Karunanidhi preferred the Eelam People’s 
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), while RAW preferred the Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organization (TELO) as it was the least ideological and fanatical group.142 
The TELO worked as a private army of RAW. As a result, other groups started to look at 
the TELO suspiciously. Other militant groups, the LTTE in particular, started to view 
RAW as an organization that worked for Indian interests rather than the benefit of 
militant groups.143   
4. Indo Sri Lanka Relations Under Rajiv Gandhi 
After the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, relations between India and Sri 
Lanka entered a less interventionist and more cordial phase, as Rajiv Gandhi’s policy 
orientation was different from his predecessors. According to Sumanasiri Liyanage and 
Kanishka Rathnapriya, “The unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, the fulfillment of 
legitimate demands and aspirations of Tamils in Sri Lanka with the absence of external 
intervention, were the main pillars of Rajiv’s Sri Lankan policy.”144 He appointed 
Romesh Bandari, instead of Parthasarathy, to establish relations with both the 
government of Sri Lanka and Tamil groups on a strong foundation and to have “quick 
and decisive results.”145 Since the setting behind intervention was based on domestic 
pressure emanating from Tamil Nadu, Rajiv Gandhi could depart from his mother’s way, 
but when Tamil Nadu agitated again in 1987, Rajiv Gandhi was compelled to embrace 
                                                 
142 Sumit Ganguly, India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 44. 
143 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, “Impact of International Pressure on Sri Lankan Ethnic 
Conflict: Global Actors but Local Failures,” Pakistan Journal of International Relations 2,  no.2 
(December, 2010):21. 
144 Liyanage, Sahadewan, and Kinra, “Indo-Lanka Relations,” 57. 
145 Ibid., 57. 
 55
his mother’s way. Rajiv Gandhi also faced considerable pressure from the lower caste 
parties in the North, so it became essential to gain support of the parties in the South. 
In the initial stage of his government supporting Tamil militants in Sri Lanka was 
not a priority of Rajiv Gandhi, and he maintained a hands-off policy regarding the ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka.146 In July 1985, he publicly stated, “The Sri Lankan Tamils should 
not expect a separate state or a federal state, but something similar to what India has.”147 
He was trying to shift the debate on the Tamil problem to a constructive plane rather than 
let the problem remain confined to one of protest and counter-protest between the two 
governments.148 
At the same time, Rajiv Gandhi did not take any action to intervene with Tamil 
Nadu support to Tamil militants, as he had to govern under his mother’s legacy. Due to 
this dual but balanced policy, Rajiv Gandhi did not have any domestic pressure to 
intervene in Sri Lankan affairs, and he could manage both Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka in a 
cordial manner. In this setting India did not need to intervene in Sri Lanka. 
This non-interventionist policy had to change in 1985 with the LTTE massacre of 
150 people at Anuradhapura. Following the incident, the Sinhalese realized that it was 
necessary to find a settlement to the conflict, and they pressured the Sri Lankan 
government to find some sort of solution. Considering the situation, Jayewardene made a 
fresh effort with Rajiv Gandhi, and for the first time he agreed with Gandhi’s proposal for 
conducting talks with separatist groups. As a result, peace talks were conducted in July 
and August 1985, in Thimphu, the capital of Bhutan, under the facilitation of India.  
The Thimphu talks deadlocked, as Sri Lankan delegates did not accept the 
demands of Tamil groups. Tamil representatives were rigidly dedicated to winning a 
separate Tamil state. They demanded “Recognition of Tamils as a distinct nationality, 
recognition that the northern and eastern provinces are the traditional Tamil homeland, 
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recognition of their right to self-determination, and granting of citizenship to all Tamils in 
the island.”149 The Sinhalese delegation strongly opposed giving the right of self- 
determination, as they regarded it as tantamount to conceding Eelam. However, Rajiv 
Gandhi did not give up his attempt. He subsequently conducted talks with the TULF and 
Sri Lankan representatives in New Delhi, but it was unworkable since Tamil groups—the 
LTTE, in particular—opposed the results. The hope was to replicate Punjab peace accord 
signed by Sikh leader Harchand Longowal and Rajiv Gandhi.150 
After this incident, Rajiv Gandhi realized that Tamil groups could not be 
controlled as India wanted, even though they received financial and military training 
facilities from India. Therefore, he ordered all militant leaders to leave India within 48 
hours. In November 1986, Tamil Nadu police undertook operations under the directives 
of the central government and seized SAM missiles, AK 47 rifles, mortars, grenades, and 
communication equipment.151 Furthermore, Rajiv Gandhi agreed with president 
Jayewardene to increase naval patrols in the Indian Ocean to control arms smuggling 
from India to Sri Lanka. Taking this situation as a grant, the Sri Lankan president 
resumed defeating Tamil militants militarily, and he mobilized troops to defeat the LTTE 
with the help of friendly countries.  
Rajiv Gandhi’s sudden policy change towards the LTTE seemed to have two 
objectives. First, he wanted to pressure the LTTE to agree with the peace negotiations if 
they wanted to continue friendlier relations with India. He knew that the LTTE could not 
survive without the covert support of India. Second, this sudden policy change convinced 
the Sri Lankan government that India was now involved with the issue in good faith. 
These two objectives helped Rajiv control both parties to a certain extent, bring them to 
the negotiating table, and reduce domestic political pressure on the central government of 
India. As Rajiv had a super majority in the parliament after the assassination of his 
mother, he was free to get decisions without based on the influences of Tamils. This is a 
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clear example of the fact that Indian government made decisions with regard to 
intervention in Sri Lanka that were based mostly on domestic concerns. 
D. SECOND TURNING POINT: OPERATION LIBERATION IN 1987  
Four years after the anti-Tamil riots in 1983, Sri Lanka laid another concrete 
foundation for India to intervene in Sri Lanka. After leaving India in 1986, Prabhakaran 
obtained control of the LTTE and planned to declare Eelam on January 1, 1987.152 At 
that time, government forces were not strong in the peninsula. Therefore, a 
communication and economic embargo was imposed as an operational tactic to control 
LTTE activities in the area. Supporting the government’s effort, the Sri Lankan 
Government Parliamentary group unanimously passed a resolution on March 7, 1987 “to 
defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Sri Lanka where necessary by 
military action.”153 With the new resolution, president Jayewardene instructed the 
military to raze the Jaffna peninsula and rebuild it. His ambition was to eradicate the 
problem from Sri Lanka while the new government in India was unsupportive of the 
Tamil groups.  
 On May 26, 1987, Sri Lankan forces launched a massive offensive operation 
against the LTTE. Eight thousand troops from the three armed forces encircled the Jaffna 
peninsula. Prior to the operation, all civilians were instructed to gather in schools and 
temples for their protection, and a 48-hour curfew was imposed in the peninsula to 
minimize civilian casualties. Troops advanced towards Jaffna city with the help of air 
raids and ground artillery supports. By May 28, troops were at the door step of enemy 
strong-holds, and the operation was very successful. The Sri Lankan Defense Minister 
said, “The military blows would force the LTTE to realize that the only path for them is 
to come for talks with the government.”154 According to government orders, about 4000 
people between the ages of 15 and 45 had been arrested and sent to detention camps in 
the southern part of the country. As a result of the embargo and severe fighting, people in 
                                                 
152 Gunarathne, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 170. 
153 Ibid., 174. 
154 Wilson, Tigers of Lanka, 226. 
 58
the Jaffna peninsula started to migrate to Tamil Nadu in India and to European countries 
causing a crisis for the Tamil Nadu state. 
 This situation was similar to the situation after anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka in 
1983, and the domestic setting compelled India to embrace interventionist attitude. 
People in Tamil Nadu pressured Indian central government to intervene to halt ongoing 
operation against the LTTE. Under this domestic setting, India had to intervene as India 
could not compromise its ethical responsibility on protecting Tamils in Sri Lanka. Non-
intervention might lead to domestic instability and political ramifications. However, the 
main objective of intervention was to address the domestic issue in India rather than 
solving the Sri Lankan problem.  
1. History Repeats: Reaction from Tamil Nadu 
With the influx of refugees, Tamil Nadu put pressure on the Indian government to 
save Tamils from annihilation by the Sri Lankan military. The arrival of new refuges 
created many administrative problems for the Tamil Nadu government, as it was still 
struggling with the effects of refugee arrival in 1983. Beyond that, Tamil Nadu 
politicians were highly concerned about the fate of Tamils trapped in the Jaffna 
peninsula. After hearing horror stories from the refugees, the Tamil Nadu people 
pressured the Tamil Nadu government to force the central government to take action as 
soon as possible. As in 1983, voicing outrage over this issue was a good way for Tamil 
Nadu politicians to increase their number of votes. Therefore, the MGR sent a fax to 
Prime Minister Gandhi to intervene to save innocent trapped civilians from the military 
advance. 
While presenting this humanitarian side of the issue, Tamil Nadu politicians 
sought to protect Tamil militant groups from the offensive by government forces. In the 
five year period following 1983, the MGR donated 200 million Indian rupees from the 
Tamil Nadu government to the LTTE for civilian welfare,155 but the LTTE had nothing 
to do with money for the welfare of people. They used this money to buy weapons and to 
acquire ships to transfer military equipment. Further, they used this money to bribe Tamil 
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Nadu officials to work for the LTTE. It is reported that the LTTE funded MDMK leader, 
Vaiko’s election campaign on behalf of his sustained support.156 
2. India Reaction due Domestic Dynamics 
The full scale war on the insurgency in the post—1987 period increased pressure 
on the Indian state. Unlike 1983, in just 40 months the Sri Lanka military had become a 
full-fledged force with sophisticated equipment. It was ready in all respects to eradicate 
the militant struggle in Sri Lanka militarily. In addition, there were several countries with 
Sri Lanka who backed the military response to the LTTE organization such as China, 
Pakistan, and Israel. However, the LTTE was also no longer a fragmented military group. 
With the assistance of RAW and the state of Tamil Nadu, it was strong enough to fight 
with government forces. Considering that tense situation, the Indian government put its 
maximum effort into negotiating with both sides without directly intervening to force the 
Sri Lankan government to terminate its offensive. It was a golden chance for India to 
intervene in Sri Lanka if India had any strategic motivation to intervene. Further, India 
could produce enough evidence to convince the legitimacy of intervention, but India did 
not intervene. This indicates that India did not have any strategic motivations to intervene 
in Sri Lanka, unless some other concern was formulated in the  interventionist setting. 
The message sent by Rajiv to Jayewardene on February 12, 1987, while the Sri 
Lankan offensive was under way, clearly shows that India did not have any strategic 
concern to intervene in Sri Lanka. Rajiv wrote: 
It appeared to be a definite move away from a political solution. You will 
agree that this is a dangerous political signal that is being transmitted. 
There is still time to get back to the negotiating table but the present trends 
are rapidly closing that opinion. I would earnestly suggest that you kindly 
consider the serious implications of these happenings. It would be in 
everybody’s interest to halt the military operations immediately, as you 
will agree, it will be difficult for India to persuade the militants to resume 
political negotiations in the current circumstances. I would humbly request 
you to consider a negotiated settlement.157  
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The Sri Lankan government responded to this message promptly, but it mentioned 
that ongoing offensives would be terminated only if militants gave up activities aimed at 
establishing a separate state and put down arms.158 The Sri Lankan government insisted 
on this condition to discontinue its military offensive—and the government was sure that 
the LTTE would not accept this condition. 
The military victory of Sri Lankan forces in 1987 was a defeat for the Indian 
central government in two aspects. The deaths of civilians and the defeat of militants in 
Sri Lanka would compromise India’s responsibility for protecting Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
Similarly, it would break the hopes of the Tamil Nadu people, which might lead to 
internal instability and unhealthy political ramifications. When “Operation Liberation” 
reached a decisive phase in May 1987, there was strong pressure from the Tamil Nadu 
center, as in 1983. As a result, India warned Sri Lanka not to touch Jaffna. If the military 
offensive was continued, India was ready to support the LTTE.159 On June 2, 1987, the 
Tamil Nadu people sent humanitarian assistance to the people of Jaffna in a convoy of 19 
trawlers but, when it reached Sri Lankan waters, the Sri Lankan navy intercepted and 
turned back the boats.160 After this incident, Tamil Nadu put pressure on the central 
government to provide humanitarian intervention. Therefore, Rajiv Gandhi was 
compelled to follow his mother’s basic policy framework of supporting Tamil insurgents 
to preserve a responsible stance of the government. The Tamil Nadu pressure once again 
was the foundation for a domestic push for intervention. In addition, by 1986, Rajiv 
Gandhi saw a weakening support in the parliament so therefore, could not afford to 
isolate the Tamil State. 
This domestic setting paved the way for India to intervene in the Sri Lankan issue. 
Initiating the interventionist phase, on June 3, 1987, five AN-32 air craft with the 
protection of four Mirage fighters forcibly entered Sri Lankan air space, violating 
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international aviation rules, and dropped 25 tons of relief material over Jaffna.161 It was 
how India responded to the Sri Lankan blockade of the Indian flotilla. This act addressed 
two parts of the Indian community. It gave symbolic Indian support, concern, and 
credibility to the desires of the Tamil Nadu people. Mainly it was done to preserve the 
Southern political front of Congress party. Similarly, this act showed the rest of India that 
the government was strong enough to make any decision to maintain India’s dominant 
role in the South-Asian region. 
3. Seeing Solutions for Sri Lanka in Indian Domestic Political Dynamics 
After successfully controlling the Sri Lankan government’s offensive against 
Tamil groups, Indian policy makers continued their interventionist attitude to find a 
settlement for the Sri Lankan issue. The main objective was to stop Tamil Nadu pressure 
on the central government over the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. Actually, they hoped to 
terminate the Sri Lankan issue prior to the Indian election in 1989 by finding a solution 
that would please the people of Tamil Nadu, if not people of Sri Lanka. India had two 
options with which to counter Tamil Nadu pressure: they could intervene either 
politically or militarily. By that time, India had tried several times to solve the problem 
by intervening politically, but a favorable result could not be achieved. The second 
option—military intervention—also could not be launched, as India was not in a position 
to send its troops without a legitimate reason. It was under these circumstances that the 
Indo-Lanka peace accord appeared. As the Indian government was in an extraordinary 
hurry to find a solution through this accord, arrangements were made to sign the accord 
without adequately eliciting consent from the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. In sum, 
the main drive behind Indian intervention was to address the domestic Indian issue, not 
the issue in Sri Lanka, yet without the consultation of the Indian population. President 
Jayewardene, meanwhile, was under pressure from Tamil radicals as well as the 
increasing radicalization of the left in Sri Lanka. 
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India’s domestic concerns behind the intervention in Sri Lanka were best 
explained by J. N. Dixit, on March 10, 1989, when he addressed the United Service 
Institution in New Delhi. He stated:  
We went to Sri Lanka to preserve our own unity; to ensure the success of a 
very different experiment that we have been carrying out ourselves. We 
claim to be the biggest functional democracy in the world….What the 
Tamils in Sri Lanka were compelled to follow, in terms of their life, which 
would have affected our polity. Because let us not forget that the first 
voice of secessionism in Indian Republic was raised in Tamil Nadu in the 
mid-sixties.162 
Fundamentally, the objective of the peace accord was satisfying the Tamils in 
Tamil Nadu. In other words, to address India’s domestic concerns. In 1990, Dixit wrote 
in Lanka Guardian magazine: 
I would like to elaborate that we have to respect the sentiments of the 50 
million Tamil citizens of India. They felt that if we did not rise, in support 
of the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka, we are not standing by our own Tamils 
and if that is so, then in the Tamil psyche, Tamil subconscious the 
question arose; is there any relevance or validity of our being part of a 
large Indian political identity, if our very deeply felt sentiments are not 
respected? So, it was a compulsion. It was not a rationalized motivation, 
but it was a compulsion which could not be avoided by any elected 
government in this country.163 
Even though India enthusiastically prepared a peace accord, both the government 
of Sri Lanka and the LTTE only agreed to follow the conditions of the accord reluctantly. 
Many Sinhalese considered the contents of the accord as preliminary arrangements to 
provide Eelam for Tamils.164 Specifically, they did not like the merging of the North and 
East provinces to make one administrative unit. Later, a North-East council was set up by 
the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution, but the Sri Lankan government refused  
power sharing as per the accord. Amidst these problems, Jayewardene signed the accord, 
since some elements of the deal would have benefited his government. His main 
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motivation was the Indian guarantee to maintain the arrangements of the accord.165 He 
wished to hand over the problem to India and find a relief for his deteriorating economy 
by reducing military expenditures. By that time, the Sri Lankan government had to 
allocate 18% of the SLR 65 billion budget to the military.166  Even though President 
Jayewardene focused upon the positive side of the accord, a majority of Sinhalese and 
some cabinet ministers considered the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord a betrayal of the 
nation. 
The LTTE also gave its consent for the accord, as it had no other option. 
Prabhakaran did not agree with the accord since it was signed without adequately 
consulting Tamils in Sri Lanka.167 It was a bi-lateral agreement between India and Sri 
Lanka. He perceived the accord as “binding Sri Lanka within India’s big power orbit,”168 
and he was reluctant to hand over weapons to the government of Sri Lanka, as per the 
peace accord, but he could not ignore any possible support from India that would allow 
him to continue his movement. He could especially not reject Gandhi’s promise to 
provide five million Indian rupees per month to the LTTE organization to rehabilitate its 
members.169 Therefore, he agreed with India’s proposal; however, he refused to contest 
for the Provincial Council election in order to mark his reluctance to the accord.170 Why 
had India been so keen to intervene and force both parties to sign an accord which was 
not accepted by them? Obviously, India wanted to control the Southern domestic pressure 
on its central government. Meanwhile, the deal satisfied the India’s Tamil pressure on its 
government to do something about the civil war in Sri Lanka. 
In addition to controlling the pressure of Tamil Nadu upon the central 
government, the Rajiv Gandhi administration expected to address many domestic 
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interests by signing the accord. According to the terms of the accord, Tamil refugees had 
to be repatriated back into Sri Lanka, and given assistance to settle in their previous 
villages. In addition, according to the accord, Rajiv to remove safe heavens of Tamil 
militants remains in Tamil Nadu, who might be potential threat in the future.171 It served 
to reduce periodic skirmishes that often disrupted the public peace. In fact, this accord 
helped India to not only control practical problems in Tamil Nadu, but also to showcase 
the central government’s political image in Tamil Nadu.172   
The main drive for sending the IPKF on July 30, 1987 to Sri Lanka was to 
maintain the terms of the accord in order to achieve two Indian domestic goals. First, 
Indian political leaders could convince the people in Tamil Nadu that the central 
government sent the Indian army for the security of innocent Tamils in Sri Lanka.173 Sri 
Lankan Tamils welcomed Indian troops as their protectors who had been sent by mother 
India, and it was a victory for the Indian Tamils’ long struggle in support of militant issue 
in Sri Lanka. Second, India wanted to maintain the peace process in a rigid frame 
allowing no room for either party to stray from the terms of the peace accord. When the 
Indian army was present, both parties had to obey the terms of the accord. If the Indian 
army could maintain a ceasefire until both parties fulfilled their obligations as per the 
accord, the Indian government could relieve themselves of Tamil Nadu pressure. 
Unexpectedly, the LTTE launched attacks against the IPKF, destroying all Indian 
expectations. 
This is considered to be one of the biggest political blunders in Indian political 
history. The fourth biggest army in the world was defeated by a primitive guerilla force, 
which had been trained by them. Dr. Rohan Gunarathne equates this defeat to the 
American, Chinese, and Soviet defeats in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, 
respectively.174  
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The Indian government sent its army to achieve domestic political goals. It did not 
have a comprehensive long-term strategy behind sending its troops to Sri Lanka. In 
addition, Indian government was not adequately concerned about the possible 
repercussions of deploying troops. When Prabhakaran started to kill innocent 
Sinhala/Tamil civilians and launched attacks against IPKF members, Rajiv Gandhi was 
compelled to retaliate as per the obligations of the peace accord. People in Southern Sri 
Lanka pointed out that the mighty IPKF could not keep the peace. Even though the IPKF 
was losing the battle, Rajiv Gandhi could not recall the Indian army as a defeated leader. 
Large number of Indians, except those who were in Tamil Nadu, saw this as a blunder. 
He could not risk hurting his political image by painting himself as a person who makes 
poor decisions.  
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IV. ROLE OF INDIA’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS  
IN TRANSFORMING ITS DECISION OF INTERVENTION  
IN THE 2000S  
India’s interventionist attitude, which was discussed in Chapter III, drastically 
changed with the setbacks of the IPKF in Sri Lanka and the assassination of Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.175 Since then, India followed a hands-off policy in the 
ethnic issue in Sri Lanka until the war there ended. Socio-political changes in the Tamil 
Nadu, which occurred after Rajiv’s assassination, encouraged the government of India to 
continue with its new policy. 
As far as India’s decision to intervene in Sri Lanka was concerned, there were two 
significant incidents after the implementation of a hands-off policy. The first incident was 
the trapping of 40,000 Sri Lankan army soldiers on the Jaffna peninsula in 2000 amidst 
the LTTE’s military offensive. The second incident was the launching of the Sri Lankan 
government’s three- year- long offensive, which wiped out the terrorist problem in Sri 
Lanka. 
Surprisingly, India did not intervene in any of these incidents, even though both 
the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE requested India’s intervention in various 
occasions: India stuck to its hands-off policy. This situation brings forth a series of 
critical questions. Why did India embrace such a different attitude? What was the reason 
behind India’s negative response to saving the lives of 40,000 Sri Lankan soldiers? Why 
did India not intervene to halt Sri Lanka army operations in 2006, as they had in 1987? 
This Chapter argues that domestic concerns were the driving force behind an 
attitudinal transformation of India. In 2000, India’s hands-off policy was shaped by 
domestic interests. India did not want to instigate Indian Tamils and destabilize the 
domestic situation in India because of an unwanted intervention. In 2006, the historically 
anti-LTTE attitude of the Indian central government was bolstered by weak pressure from 
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Tamil Nadu, and these together shaped India’s hands-off policy and non-intervention. 
Overall, India’s decision regarding intervention was deeply shaped by domestic concerns. 
This chapter contains three sections. The first section describes the socio-political 
transformation of India in view of the Sri Lankan issue, including the background of 
India’s hands-off policy and measures taken to implement it. Further, it describes changes 
in the Tamil Nadu and how they persuaded the central government to maintain its new 
policy. After that, the second section focuses on India’s hands-off attitude during the 
debacle in 2000. It shows how domestic concerns discouraged India’s decision of 
intervention in support of the government of Sri Lanka, even though intervention would 
have been strategically advantageous. The third section focuses on India’s behavior 
during the final war in Sri Lanka. First, it describes how Tamil Nadu pressure weakened 
support for intervention, compared to the 1980s. Then, it argues that weak Tamil Nadu 
pressure was the main factor that contributed to a hands-off policy and non-intervention. 
It describes the complexities of the domestic aspirations of India during this period, and 
how India worked to achieve its aspirations by avoiding intervention. Finally, the chapter 
elaborates how Indian policy in Sri Lanka after the ethnic conflict was shaped by 
domestic dynamics in India. 
A. BACKGROUND OF INDIA’S HANDS-OFF POLICY 
After a disastrous interventionist attitude towards Sri Lanka in the 1980s, India 
unexpectedly stepped back from intervention in the Sri Lankan issue at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Activities of the government of Sri Lanka, the LTTE organization, and both 
the Sinhalese and Tamil people in Sri Lanka discouraged India from actively 
participating in the Sri Lankan internal conflict. As a result, many Indian rulers steered 
clear of the issue, but India cautiously kept an eye on the progress of the ethnic conflict in 
Sri Lanka, as the political front in Tamil Nadu could instigate an action at any time in 
favor of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. This domestic situation circumscribed India’s ability to 
intervene in a considerable manner. 
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1. Anti-Indian Activities of the LTTE 
India’s policy towards the Sri Lankan issue entered an entirely different phase in 
the post-accord period, since the LTTE treated the IPKF in a hostile manner.176 The 
LTTE resorted to guerilla warfare and confronted Indian soldiers on Sri Lankan soil. 
Ultimately, the Indian force that came to safeguard the rights of Sri Lankan Tamils 
became victims of the LTTE. The IPKF lost 1200 lives, and over 3500 were wounded.177 
In addition, India spent 20 million Indian rupees per day to maintain their force in Sri 
Lanka. These incidents created a situation in which the non-Tamil Indian communities 
could blame the central government for involvement in an unwanted war—one that was 
the result of pressure from the Tamil Nadu people. Non-Tamils regarded the LTTE solely 
as a terrorist organization that was responsible for Gandhi’s assassination. In fact, 
activities of the LTTE made India’s decision of intervention questionable. This situation 
drastically reduced the Indian government’s support for Tamil militants in Sri Lanka. 
These circumstances paved the way for the Indian government to create a wedge 
between the LTTE organization and the rest of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. When 
the LTTE started to kill members of other Tamil groups in Sri Lanka to highlight its 
position, India further isolated the LTTE. India wanted the LTTE to be a powerless 
organization which can’t win the hearts and minds of the Tamil Nadu people. India did 
not want the LTTE to be strong enough to represent the Sri Lankan Tamil community. 
India viewed strengthening of the LTTE as a threat to internal stability of India from the 
beginning of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. In the 1980s, India initially supported the 
TELO. Later, with tremendous pressure from Tamil Nadu, especially from AIADMK 
leader M. G. Ramachandran, India had to treat the LTTE with undue recognition.178 As 
the domestic stability of India was at the top of the central government’s agenda, India 
had to assist the LTTE unwillingly.  
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Since the LTTE knew this situation from the beginning, it was compelled to fight 
with India. It established its own independent ways of acquiring arms,179 and it did not 
agree to hand over such acquired weapons to the government of Sri Lanka, in spite of the 
obligations of the peace accord that was brokered by India.180 Ultimately, this paved the 
way for the LTTE to fight with the IPKF fiercely between 1987 and 1989. In the end, the 
IPKF became a lost mission for India. It was this domestic circumstance that prompted 
India to adopt a hands-off attitude towards the Sri Lankan issue in general, and develop 
an antagonistic attitude towards the LTTE.181  
2. Anti-Indian Activities of Sinhalese 
India’s hands-off policy was not solely a product of the LTTE’s behavior. 
Activities of the Sri Lankan government and the Sinhalese nationalist parties also 
contributed equally in this regard. President R. Premadasa, who was the successor of 
President J. R. Jayawardana, vehemently emphasized that the IPKF should be withdrawn 
from Sri Lanka to solve the ethnic conflict in the country. It is reported that president 
Premadasa gave military equipment to the LTTE to fight with the IPKF, in order to 
outflank India.182 Encouraging Premadasa, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a 
leftist group in Sri Lanka, protested all over the country to pressure the Indian 
government to remove its forces from Sri Lanka.183 Even though India hesitated to leave, 
as it would have left unfinished business in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankans no longer expected 
India’s help in resolving the conflict. 
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Considering the growing pressure in Sri Lanka, Prime Minister V P Singh agreed 
to withdraw the IPKF by March 31, 1990. This decision had a huge impact on the INC’s 
political stability. Many non-Tamil Indians started to look at the INC as a political group 
that made decisions to protect votes coming from the Southern flank. The loss of Indian 
lives in the battle against the LTTE was a leading theme in Indian politics. Gradually, 
India changed its priorities and objectives regarding involvement in the Sri Lankan case, 
as a result of these circumstances, and moved towards a hands-off policy.  
Under the new policy, V P Singh had to follow a reciprocal course based upon the 
“Indira Doctrine,” which encouraged India to play a big brother role in the South Asian 
region. He disassociated himself from the Congress party in Sri Lanka184 and adopted a 
new doctrine, prepared by the External Affairs Minister I K Gujral, which declared, “as 
long as Sri Lanka does not attempt to undermine India’s security interests and does not 
muddle its internal ethnic conflict to avoid its effects spill over to India, it [India] would 
not interfere again in Sri Lankan affairs.” This was a clear message that India was 
sending to Sri Lanka. Long after the rule of V P Singh was over, key points of his hands-
off policy remained an active part of Indian policy towards Sri Lanka. It included 
following main elements:  
(1) India had been wrong in getting involved in the ethnic crisis of Sri 
Lanka; (2) [the] Indo-Lanka agreement conceived by Rajiv Gandhi and 
Jayawardana was an ill prepared effort which resulted in misunderstanding 
between India and Sri Lanka; (3) Sending of the IPKF to Sri Lanka was 
interference of that country’s internal affairs; (4) this situation has been 
remedied by India completely withdrawing from Sri Lankan affairs and 
withdrawal of the IPKF. The Sri Lankan government should deal with its 
Tamil problem as an internal affair in which India would not take any 
interest. The continuation of the internal conflict in Sri Lanka or support 
for the settlement from Tamil Nadu are matters which will be dealt with 
through normal diplomatic channels.185 
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3. Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
In addition to the IPKF debacle, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi by an LTTE suicide bomber in an election rally in Tamil Nadu also was a 
significant factor in distancing India from the Sri Lanka issue.186 As revealed, the 
bomber killed Rajiv Gandhi because of his anti-LTTE policies—he did not accept the 
LTTE as his mother did, although he let the Tamil Nadu politicians maintain connections 
with the LTTE to preserve his Southern political front. However, he was well aware that 
the LTTE’s objectives were different from those of India. Specifically, the LTTE’s strong 
desire to have a separate state in Sri Lanka, which was opposed by India, was viewed by 
Rajiv Gandhi as a possible threat to the unity of India. The leadership of the LTTE 
viewed Rajiv Gandh’s attitude as a threat to its movement. Therefore, it planned to kill 
him prior to the election.187 As this incident was a clear sign that Indian territory was 
vulnerable to LTTE infiltration attacks, India decided to take an even stricter approach to 
its hands-off policy towards Sri Lanka. No future Indian government was willing to risk 
LTTE association, and they maintained a hands-off policy until the mid-2000s.188 
4. Nationalist Politics and Political Uncertainties of India 
Growing nationalist politics and political uncertainties in India also affected the 
continuing hands-off policy towards Sri Lanka. From 1991 onward, not a single political 
party could get a majority in elections to form unitary governments. V P Singh’s 
government, which was elected in 1991, was a coalition of many regional parties. 
Vajpayee’s government, which came into power in 1998, was also a coalition. The 
election results in 2004 also did not give the required majority to any party to form a 
unitary government. In general, parties in these governments had varying and opposing 
political ideologies on issues that had national and international importance. Under this 
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new political constellation, the Indian central government always preferred to avoid 
political risk to the center. The hands-off policy was the best remedy. 
Intervention by India in favor of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, as in the 1980s, was not 
an advisable policy for India, as it had an indirect impact on increasing communal 
tensions between Hindus and Indian Muslims. In 1992, Hindus demolished the Babra 
Masjid temple in Ayodya, but the Union Government at the center failed to make 
preventive decisions promptly.189 This situation attracted militant Muslim politics and 
allowed Pakistan to intervene in Indian internal matters.  
At the same time, the LTTE began to chase away Muslims from the area it had 
demarcated to establish its imagined Eelam state. Many innocent Muslims in the Tamil 
areas of Sri Lanka had to escape to Sinhalese areas in the South.190 Unlike India, 
Muslims in Sri Lanka had a separate religious identity, and their concerns had to be 
addressed separately. Hence, support for the Sri Lankan Tamil movement by India, as in 
the 1980s, might have agitated both the Sri Lankan and Indian Muslims. In addition, if 
India ignored the rights of Muslims in Sri Lanka, there might be a chance of creating 
undesirable ramifications for thousands of Indian employees in Middle Eastern countries. 
Therefore, India allowed the Sri Lankan government to find solutions for their internal 
problem,191 as India did not want to radicalize docile Islamic groups in South Asia. 
These domestic circumstances also worked to make the hands-off policy the best option 
for India to follow in terms of Sri Lankan issue. 
When all of the root causes for India’s maintenance of a hands-off policy towards 
Sri Lanka are analyzed, it is evident that Indian domestic concerns were the driving force 
that shaped this policy. Indian rulers did not want to put their country in a dangerous 
situation because of an unwanted internal conflict in another country. The willingness of 
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nationalist Sinhalese groups’ and some Sri Lankan Tamils to keep India out of direct 
intervention also worked to help the Indian government maintain its hands-off policy.   
5. Implementation of Hands-off Policy  
In the light of the events described, the Congress party government under 
Narasimha Rao carefully defined its attitudes toward the Sri Lanka issue. His policy 
consisted of three main features. First, he decided not to play the “guardian” role of the 
Tamil people in Sri Lanka in the context of the ethnic problem. Second, he separated the 
Tamil problem in Sri Lanka from the LTTE issue and did not accept the LTTE as the sole 
representative of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. With that, demands of the LTTE 
were no longer considered synonymous with the aspirations of the Tamil people in Sri 
Lanka. Third, he determined to defuse security and political challenges posed by the 
LTTE in the region in general, and inside India in particular.  
The Narasimha Rao government initiated many steps to bar LTTE activities on 
Indian soil. Initially, he proclaimed the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) 
in Tamil Nadu to crackdown on LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu.192 With that, he 
expected to stop the inclination of nationalist Tamil Nadu factions towards the LTTE 
movement. Furthermore, in 1992, he declared the LTTE an “unlawful association.”193 
The primary reason for the ban was to stop possible secessionist aspirations in Tamil 
Nadu. On May 14, 1992, in the Rajya Sabha, the Indian Home Minister stated, “the larger 
objective of the LTTE went beyond the establishment of a Tamil homeland in 
northeastern Sri Lanka and hence posed a threat to Indian sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.” In addition to the ban, India charged Prabakaran and his intelligence chief 
Pottu Amman with the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.194 Therefore, 
Prabakaran became a wanted man in India. As a result, he could no longer move freely in 
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Tamil Nadu—no more than he had been able to in the 1980s. In sum, India isolated the 
LTTE, both from the Indian Tamil community and the Sri Lankan Tamil community, 
with these legal measures. 
Altered security perceptions in both Sri Lanka and India led to a convergence of 
their security interests over the issue of growing LTTE terrorism, and compelled India to 
implement its hands-off policy. The killing of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President 
R. Premadasa in 1991 and 1993 respectively highlighted the LTTE as a common threat to 
both India and Sri Lanka. This growing terrorist problem—capable of killing the Indian 
prime minister—was considered a top threat that should be addressed immediately. The 
LTTE’s connection with Tamil Nadu nationalist groups further compelled India to seek a 
solution to the problem. For success, India had to maintain a strong relationship with Sri 
Lanka to jointly counter their common enemy. In this light, the new rulers of Sri Lanka 
during this period looked at India as a positive source of support for eliminating terrorism 
from Sri Lanka.195 Relations at the top political level gradually left to the formation of a 
positive image of India in Sri Lankan society. Similarly, India also perceived Sri Lanka 
from a different angle than it had in the 1980s. To symbolize their happiness with India’s 
new attitude, the Government of Sri Lanka accepted 13,166 Sri Lankan refugees back 
home from India. 
Responding positively, India agreed to sign a free trade agreement with Sri Lanka 
in 1998 to strengthen ties between the two countries on the economic front.196 According 
to the agreement, India would provide free duty on 102 items and 50 percent duty 
reduction for over 400 items. Furthermore, India assisted the Sri Lanka navy in its 
mission of blocking illegal transportation to Sri Lanka through the Palk Straight. On 
January 16, 1993, the Indian Navy intercepted a 280-ton LTTE cargo ship, “MV Ahat,” 
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with a load of weapons, communication equipment, and explosives in the Palk Straight. 
This was a blow to the LTTE in acquiring military ware for their organization. 
B. CHANGES IN TAMIL NADU WITH REGARD TO SRI LANKAN ISSUE 
With the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, many Tamil Nadu political parties moved 
away from their support for the LTTE’s separation struggle in Sri Lanka. Similarly, the 
IPKF debacle in Sri Lanka also considerably distanced Indian political parties from the 
LTTE, since many of the Indian soldiers killed in Sri Lanka were from Tamil Nadu’s 
Madras regiment. Therefore, many Tamil Nadu politicians willingly supported the hands-
off policy of the central government. Sometimes, growing public opposition to the LTTE 
compelled some political parties to join with the policy of the central government. 
Contrarily, there were also nationalistic groups in Tamil Nadu who continued their 
support for the LTTE, even though it was an illegal act. However, in general, Tamil Nadu 
support for the LTTE was drastically reduced compared to the 1980s. This less 
supportive situation translated into less pressure upon the central government, which was 
able to continue its hands-off policy smoothly. 
1. Distracting Major Political Parties from the Sri Lankan Issue 
The Sri Lankan issue was a vote-making machine in Tamil Nadu politics in the 
1980s, but shouting out support for the LTTE’s separation movement in Sri Lanka was 
no longer a valid way to get votes in the 1990s.197 The DMK government, which 
supported the Tamil movement in the 1980s, was toppled in a 1991 election. By that 
time, the Tamil Nadu people realized the real nature of the civil war in Sri Lanka, and a 
majority of them were against the LTTE.198 They did not accept the LTTE’s 
assassinations of peer Tamil groups and prominent Tamil figures who expressed anti-
LTTE sentiments. The killing of the EPRLF leader Padmananda and 15 others in Madras 
in 1990 convinced the Indian people of the LTTE’s self-serving attitudes. This socio-
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political situation worked to part major Tamil Nadu political parties from the Sri Lankan 
issue in a significant way. 
The new AIADMK government under Jayalalitha understood the aspirations of 
the Tamil Nadu people very well. She had a strident anti-LTTE stance and led the 
demand to ban the LTTE in India, but she was equally vocal and concerned about the 
plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.199 She expressed her pro-Tamil credentials by 
highlighting the grievances of the Tamil Nadu fishermen, the killing of innocent Tamils 
in bombardments of the Sri Lanka Air Force, and the deprivation of Tamil rights. This 
was perfectly aligned with the policy of the central government. Furthermore, her policy 
was also in sync with the aspirations of Tamil Nadu people. But since the central 
government did not have any intense domestic pressure from Tamil Nadu to intervene in 
the Sri Lankan case—as it had in the 1980s—India could maintain its hands-off policy 
without any difficulties.  
2. Sustained Nationalist Support 
Even though support of political parties in Tamil Nadu for the Sri Lankan issue 
waxed and waned in accordance with their political considerations, the support of Tamil 
nationalists towards the LTTE remained solid. Individuals like Nedumaran supported the 
LTTE, helping it survive in critical times. When the LTTE was banned, his enthusiasm 
for the LTTE did not dim—he publicly supported it without any consideration for the 
new anti-terrorist laws. Aware of this unchanging support, the LTTE kept in close contact 
with Tamil nationalist groups, and maintained ties with them that were stronger than 
those they had with the major political parties.   
Besides Nedumaran, chief of PDK Kolathur Mani and chief of DK K. Weeramani 
also helped the LTTE maintain its logistic network in Tamil Nadu, even while the IPKF 
was fighting in Sri Lanka. It is reported that hundreds of LTTE members were trained in 
Kolathur Mani’s farm near Salem.200 These politicians organized hunger strikes and 
protests for de-proscription of the LTTE, and worked to make the LTTE acceptable to 
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Tamil Nadu people. In a situation where there was no freedom to move freely in Tamil 
Nadu, the support given by nationalists groups was very important for the sustenance of 
the LTTE. 
Even though these nationalist movements in Tamil Nadu were not strong enough 
to change the anti-LTTE attitude of the Tamil Nadu people, or change the stance of 
political parties towards the LTTE, they were able to force the Indian central government 
to maintain a “soft approach” towards Tamil Militants in Sri Lanka. It was this domestic 
pressure that compelled India to maintain a hands-off policy, and not support the 
government of Sri Lanka in crushing the LTTE militarily. The Indian government knew 
that the fire under the ashes in Tamil Nadu could ignite at any time if India leaned closer 
to the government of Sri Lanka. The neutrality of the Tamil Nadu people with regard to 
the Sri Lankan issue was very important if India was to maintain a stable domestic 
situation.    
C. DEBACLE OF THE SRI LANKA ARMY IN 2000 AND INDIA’S NON-
INTERVENTION 
In April 2000, Tamil militants captured the Elephant pass area, the land 
connection of Jaffna peninsula to the mainland, outmaneuvering two divisions of the Sri 
Lankan army. As a result 35,000–40,000 Sri Lankan soldiers were trapped in the Jaffna 
peninsula, which had one harbor and an airfield.201 The airfield was inside the artillery 
fire range of the Tamil militants. As a result, air transportation to the peninsula had to be 
severely restricted. The only possible replenishment was via the Kankasanthuray harbor, 
but port facilities were inadequate to handle the sudden and unexpected shipments that 
resulted from the closure of Palaly airport. In addition, the sea shipping lane from 
Colombo to Kankasanthuray was interrupted by LTTE sea tigers, which was under their 
control. Even though the situation was disastrous, the government of Sri Lanka could not 
let the peninsula be captured by the LTTE, as the area was tactically important for further 
military operations. Under this situation, the advancement of Tamil militants towards the 
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North had to be stopped at any cost to save the lives of thousands of Sri Lankan 
government soldiers. 
Considering the situation, the Sri Lankan government asked for military 
assistance from India to save the soldiers, since India had been in a position to intervene 
from the beginning. Then-president Chandrika Kumaranathunga earnestly requested that 
visiting Indian air force chief A. Y. Tepnis convince the Indian government to intervene 
in the critical situation.202 Even Sinhalese nationalist groups who opposed Indian 
involvement in the 1980s pleaded for India to somehow rescue Sinhalese soldiers from 
military disaster. However, none of these requests were strong enough to change India’s 
standing hands-off policy towards the Sri Lankan issue. A B Vajpayee’s government  
refused to assist militarily, or even provide assistance to evacuate soldiers.203 He could 
not upset the three Tamil parties in his 25-party coalition. He said, “If Jaffna falls to the 
LTTE, it will not be for the first time. However, he later advised the Indian Navy to ready 
ships to evacuate the beleaguered soldiers from Jaffna peninsula. 
This was not what the Sri Lankan government expected, since India had always 
been firm in its position about the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Throughout history, 
not a single Indian ruler expressed his or her support for dividing Sri Lanka under any 
circumstances—but Vajpayee’s decision ran contrary to this legacy. Assistance in 
evacuating the soldiers meant support for LTTE control of Jaffna peninsula. This 
situation distanced Sri Lanka from India, and paved the way for Sri Lanka to get military 
assistance from other countries, a situation which was strategically disadvantageous for 
India. 
1. Strategic Concerns and Non-intervention 
Countries that have hegemonic aspirations legitimize their position by providing 
various kinds of assistance, including economic and military assistance, to other countries 
in the region. They provide this aid—often at an enormous cost—to stabilize their 
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dominant role in the region and to subordinate other countries while achieving interests in 
both a national and international context.204 Sometimes, hegemony leads to an alignment 
of the hegemonic country with issues of weaker countries—issues which are not in 
hegemonic country’s overall interest—in order to convince weaker countries of the 
dominance of the hegemonic country. This process motivates weak states in the region to 
establish inter-state relations with the hegemonic country to secure their sustenance, since 
the hegemonic power is able to ensure the security of the weaker.205 Therefore, problems 
of a weaker state which cannot be solved with available resources often provide an 
opportunity for a stronger state to spread its hegemonic stance. How did this phenomenon 
apply to India? 
Since its independence, India had taken measures to avoid non-regional power 
intervention in affairs of the South Asian region. This attitude of India shifted to a 
hegemonic stance in the 1970s, which grew during the rule of the first explicitly 
pragmatic prime minister, Indira Gandhi. She articulated this in her “Indira Doctrine” to 
establish the regional aspirations of India. As Bhaban Sen Gupta wrote, “India will not 
tolerate external intervention in a conflict situation in any south Asian country, if the 
intervention has any implicit or explicit anti-Indian implications. No south Asian 
government should therefore ask for external assistance with an anti-Indian bias from any 
country.”206 According to Neil Devotta, “India will neither intervene in the domestic 
affairs of any state in the region unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention 
by an outside power.” Obviously, India was fully committed to being the dominant 
regional power and regional security manager in South Asia until the assassination of 
Rajiv Gandhi. India did not allow any non-regional country to intervene to solve 
problems in the region. As Aniruddha Gupta wrote, “Indian intervention and its foreign 
policy towards its neighbors were, in many ways, a strategy designed to create a regional 
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order in which the ranks of south Asian nations are determined by the nature of their 
relations with India.”207 As far as India’s aspirations in the South Asian region were 
concerned, the situation that arose in 2000 was a splendid chance for India to show its 
position in the region to both regional and international countries. However, India did not 
take this opportunity. 
Non-intervention to assist Sri Lankan forces in 2000 derailed India’s long- rooted 
policy of avoiding non-regional power involvement in the South Asian region. Because 
India did not offer support, the government of Sri Lanka moved significantly towards 
India’s arch rival Pakistan and Western countries. This situation paved the way for 
Pakistan to strengthen its relations with Sri Lanka significantly. It was Pakistan that 
provided multi-barrel rocket launchers to the Sri Lankan army to counter Tamil troops 
advancing towards the Jaffna peninsula.208 It is reported that Pakistan had its fighter 
aircraft on standby to bomb Tamil militant targets if the situation went beyond control of 
the Sri Lanka army. Meanwhile, China and Israel provided weapons promptly, and the 
U.S. dispatched parts of its fifth fleet stationed in Panama to signal its solidarity towards 
Sri Lanka. 
 In fact, Sri Lanka’s inclination towards other countries clearly jeopardized the 
strategic concerns of India. Still, India did not intervene to settle the problem, even 
though this non-action was strategically disadvantageous. In addition, India did not 
attempt to block Sri Lankan relations with other countries. This was obviously contrary to 
the “Indira doctrine.” This situation provides evidence that strategic concerns were not 
the driving factor for India’s non-intervention in the Sri Lankan issue in 2000. It appears 
that there was another—more significant—factor that shaped India’s decision about 
intervention during this incident. 
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2. Weak Domestic Concerns: The Reason the Reason of India’s 
Unsupportive Behavior 
India’s decision for intervention or non-intervention in Sri Lanka was shaped by 
domestic concerns. India’s interventionist attitude in the 1980s, which was discussed in 
the third chapter, was shaped by the domestic concerns of India. The hands-off policy 
that was practiced after the IPKF debacle and the assassination of Rajiv, which was 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, was also shaped by domestic concerns. India’s 
policy towards the Sri Lankan issue in 2000 is a good example that exemplifies how not 
only the interventionist attitude, but also the non-interventionist attitude, was shaped by 
domestic concerns. 
The main domestic concern behind the Indian government’s non-intervention 
decision in 2000 was the dilemma of the reaction by Tamil Nadu. Neil Devotta writes 
that “the pressure imposed on the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governing 
coalition headed by the Bharathiya Janatha Party (BJP) by some of its southern allies was 
bound to make the Indian government cautious.”209 By that time, there was no serious 
pressure on the central government from the people of Tamil Nadu, as many of them had 
rejected the LTTE’s policies. However, these people were very much concerned about 
the innocent Tamils in Sri Lanka. They preferred to live with this difficult political 
situation instead of risking a military solution, and the terrible  fallout that has for 
innocent civilians. 
Given these circumstances, supporting Sri Lanka with military equipment was not 
advisable for the Indian government, since that might cause the then-silent Tamil Nadu 
people to raise their voices to pressure the central government as they had in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, such assistance could legitimize the anti-Sri Lankan slogans of the MDMK, 
PMK, and DK, which were not strong enough at that time to put any considerable 
pressure on the central government to de-proscribe the LTTE and assist the Tamil 
movement in Sri Lanka. If India assisted the Sri Lankan forces, the MDMK, PMK, and 
DK could then highlight how India had assisted Sri Lankan forces in the killing of 
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innocent Tamils in Sri Lanka. As DMK leader Karunanidi stated, “India should not lend 
itself to the massacre of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Indian army should not be instrumental 
in the killing of Tamils and India military equipment should not be used for it. This is my 
strong stand-point.”210 
In 2000, the unpredictable situation in Tamil Nadu influenced decision making at 
a higher level in the Indian central government than it had in the 1980s. This was because 
the NDA government was comprised of 24 parties and had no idea about the policy that 
they should embrace towards Sri Lanka. Neil Devotta writes of this situation, “the lack of 
such consensus has not precluded Indian leaders from acting in a decisive, even harm-
fisted fashion whenever they held India’s security interests were being compromised.”211 
It was primarily this domestic concern that shaped India’s non-interventionist behavior in 
2000. 
In addition to the political dilemma in Tamil Nadu, the overextension of the 
Indian military also contributed to India’s non-interventionist policy in Sri Lanka in 
2000. Escalation of the Kashmir problem in the 1990s was the main cause of military 
overextension. By that time, over 500,000 Indian troops were stationed in Kashmir,212 
and the India military had lost 3520 lives in Kashmir from 1988 to 2000. This imposed a 
severe strain on the Indian military. By the end of the 1990s, about three dozen military 
groups were operating in Kashmir, and that created an enormous pressure on the Indian 
military. In 1999, this situation came to a climax with the initiation of the Cargill war. 
This escalating situation in Kashmir, no doubt, created a huge pressure on the central 
government, allowing little room for it to consider intervention in the military debacle in 
Sri Lanka. 
In addition to the Kashmir problem, insurgencies in Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, 
and Manipur in northeast India further contributed to the overextension of the Indian 
military. Even though fighting in these areas did not capture the same attention as 
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Kashmir, more than 1700 Indian soldiers died in these insurgencies in 1988 and 2000.213 
Similarly, continuation of the war in Siachen Glacier also taxed the Indian army. Naxalite 
violence in Madya Pradesh, and cast conflicts in states such as Bihar, further deteriorated 
the situation. By 1997, the Indian army had a shortage of 13000 junior and middle rank 
officers to counter various terrorist problems on various fronts.214 This overextended 
military situation restricted the government’s capability to flex its muscles to intervene in 
the Sri Lankan issue.  
When all these matters are considered, India’s non-intervention in 2000 clearly 
demonstrates that India’s decision to intervene in Sri Lanka was shaped by domestic 
concerns. Even though major Tamil Nadu political groups accepted the Indian 
government’s hands-off policy towards the LTTE, the central government hesitated to 
make decisions against the LTTE. Rulers did not want to agitate Tamil Nadu and create 
internal instability in India to address a problem in another country. Therefore, it is 
obvious that India’s domestic concerns were the driving factor behind the policy of 
Indian non-intervention in Sri Lanka. 
D. INDIA’S NON-INTERVENTION DURING THE FINAL WAR IN SRI 
LANKA 
In April 2003, the LTTE announced that it would unilaterally withdraw from the 
peace talks brokered by Norway, because the LTTE had been excluded from the donor 
conference, which took place in the United States. However, the ceasefire continued for 
another three years. In July 2006, the ceasefire collapsed at the ground level with the 
closure of the “Mavil Aru” sluice gate in the Trincomalee district by the LTTE.215 
Because of the closure, thousands of acres of paddy fields could not be cultivated due to a 
shortage of water. This paved the way for newly-elected president Mr. Mahinda 
Rajapaksha to fulfill his election promise to eradicate terrorism from Sri Lanka and create 
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a peaceful country where all communities live in harmony. It also allowed him to follow 
up on his commitment to make the LTTE irrelevant in any political negotiations, in terms 
of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.216 The unprecedented military offensive that started 
with the “Marvil Aru” issue continued for three years, and the LTTE was eventually 
militarily defeated on July 18, 2009. 
India’s attitude towards the military offensive in 2006 was drastically different 
from its attitude in 1987. In 1987, India directly intervened to stop a military operation 
launched to capture the Jaffna peninsula. However, when the Sri Lankan government 
launched a much stronger military offensive to liberate the whole area under the control 
of the LTTE in 2006, India did not force the government of Sri Lanka to stop its 
offensive. Surprisingly, after government forces were successful in defeating the LTTE 
militarily, India covertly supported ongoing offensives by the government of Sri 
Lanka.217 The weakened domestic concerns in Indian society for the Sri Lankan issue, 
which were the result of socio-political changes, shaped India’s non-interventionist 
policy in Sri Lanka during the period of the Sri Lankan government’s offensive against 
the LTTE.   
1. Responses of Tamil Nadu 
The final war in Sri Lanka created a situation that was in many respects similar to 
the “Operation Liberation” period in 1987; however, in 2006 the response of Tamil Nadu 
was much more complex. As far as the main political parties were concerned, former 
Chief Minister and AIADMK leader Jayalalitha was anti-LTTE and continued to restrain 
LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu.218 Meanwhile, Chief Minister Karunanidhi was 
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pragmatic in his policies towards the LTTE.219 PMK leader S Ramadoss, who had party 
shares at the center, was also ambivalent. DK leader K Weeramani kept quiet and refused 
to issue any statement regarding the situation in Sri Lanka. In fact, the sentiments almost 
all of the major political parties in Tamil Nadu cooled significantly with regard to the 
LTTE during the final war period in Sri Lanka. Most of them embraced a centrist policy. 
The unpopularity of the LTTE among the people in Tamil Nadu after the assassination of 
Rajiv prompted political leaders to step back from the Sri Lankan issue. 
Even though the Tamil community in Tamil Nadu was less sympathetic towards 
the LTTE, they were highly concerned about the plight of innocent Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
They put pressure upon the central government to pass measures to safeguard the lives of 
innocent Tamils. 
Meanwhile, political leaders like Vaiko, Thol Thirumavalavan, and Pazha. 
Nedumaran of the MDMK publicly supported the LTTE irrespective of the legal 
restrictions and lobbied hard for the protection of Tamils in Sri Lanka.220 Unlike other 
political leaders, the main objective of these politicians was to protect the LTTE from 
ongoing military offensives, even though they pretended that their main focus was the 
innocent Tamils. Following in the footsteps of these politicians, nationalist Tamil 
groups—which included substantial sectors of civil society—protested to force the Indian 
government to pressure Sri Lanka into a ceasefire. They conducted state-wide 
demonstrations, fasts, and hunger strikes to demonstrate their opposition to the policy of 
the Indian central government on the issue of Sri Lanka, but their pressure was not strong 
enough to change the attitude of the Indian government towards Sri Lanka. Worldwide 
anti-terrorist sentiments after the 9/11 incident also worked to encourage the Indian 
government to turn a blind eye to nationalist Tamil Nadu agitations.  
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2. Factors that Weakened Tamil Nadu Pressure 
Pressure created by the Tamil community in India against the offensive launched 
by the government of Sri Lanka was not strong enough to compel India to intervene in 
the Sri Lankan issue for several reasons. Mainly, socio-political changes had occurred 
both in India and Sri Lanka. As far as the Indian domestic situation was concerned, legal 
constraints weakened Tamil Nadu pressure on the center. According to the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities Act, any public gathering with the intention of supporting terrorist 
activities was an illegal act. In addition, as the LTTE was a proscribed organization in 
India, any act that seemed to be supportive of the LTTE also became an illegal act. 
Therefore, the nationalistic Tamil Nadu people could not openly support the LTTE as 
they had in the 1980s. The only thing they could do was pressure the central government 
to force Sri Lanka to stick to political negotiations in the name of the grievances of 
innocent civilians. When the Indian government promised to ensure the security of 
innocent civilians, nationalistic Indian Tamils did not have any remaining excuse to 
create problems for the center. 
a. Changes Occurred in India 
The instability of the Tamil Nadu politicians and the new complexities of 
the Sri Lanka issue worked to divide and weaken the power of Tamil Nadu. For example, 
while the political posture of the AIADMK was anti-LTTE, parties like the DMK and 
DK were pragmatic and ambivalent in terms of the Sri Lankan issue. Meanwhile, 
nationalistic parties remained pro-LTTE. This division among major political parties in 
Tamil Nadu reduced its power on the center. In the 1980s, when all of these groups 
worked together, their power was strong enough to effectively pressure the central 
government. 
Even though nationalistic Tamil political parties put pressure on the center 
in favor of the LTTE, in 2006 the Congress party led the United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) coalition at the center to disregard such pressures. The ruling coalition had 335 
members in a 552-member parliament and could easily survive even if the DMK pulled 
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out.221 When a coalition is composed of numerous political parties, the national party 
leading the coalition has many options in pursuing its policies. Therefore, the power of 
one party in dictating the policies of the coalition is drastically reduced. For instance, 
when the Communist parties in the UPA coalition were against the Indo-U.S. nuclear 
agreement, the Congress party cut them from the coalition and enticed the Samajwadi 
party to join the coalition, maintaining a majority in the parliament. 
It is true that the Tamil constituency at the center had a power that other 
coalition partners did not. The DMK was the third-largest party in the UPA coalition. 
Using its majority as an advantage, in the latter part of the final war in Sri Lanka some 
DMK parliamentarians warned the UPA that they would resign and undermine the UPA 
unless India did not intervene in the Sri Lanka issue. However, the UPA did not take such 
threats seriously because “while the party played a vital role in propping up the UPA, the 
Congress in Tamil Nadu played a major role propping up the minority DMK government 
in the state legislature.”222 As a result, the pressure created by Tamil Nadu politicians 
was not strong enough to shape Indian policy towards Sri Lanka. 
In addition to division among politicians, new divisions among the people 
in Tamil Nadu also weakened Tamil Nadu’s power at the center. Unlike the 1980s, many 
Tamils were anti-LTTE, while some were pro-LTTE.223 Some recommended 
intervention in the Sri Lankan issue, and some strongly opposed intervening because of 
the bitter memories of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, some accepted LTTE as the 
sole representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils, and some separated the LTTE and the 
Tamil community. The Tamil Nadu people did not accept the demands of the LTTE as 
synonymous with demands of Tamils.224 Because of these inter-state divisions among 
the people, none of the groups were strong enough to influence the center.  
                                                 
221 , C. A. Chandraprema, Gota’s War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka 
(Colombo: Piyasiri Printing, 2012), 477. 
222 Sumit Ganguly, India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 48. 
223 Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political 
Economy (London: Routledge,2009), 154. 
224 P. Sahadewan, “India’s Foreign Policy,” 204. 
 89
b. Changes Occurred in Sri Lanka 
Changes that occurred in Sri Lanka also weakened the support of Tamil 
Nadu for the LTTE. When Karuna, the LTTE leader in the Eastern theater, detached 
himself from the LTTE in 2004, the military capability of the LTTE was reduced.225 This 
incident disappointed pro-LTTE Tamils in India. Similarly, when members of the Karuna 
and Prabakaran groups began to kill each other, pro-LTTE sentiments in Tamil Nadu 
were further reduced. Forcible conscription into the LTTE, to overcome the shortage of 
manpower after the detachment of the Karuna group, was not accepted by some Indian 
Tamils and this incident also strengthened anti-LTTE attitudes. Ultimately, many pro-
LTTE people in Tamil Nadu stepped back from the LTTE for all of these reasons.  
LTTE activities during the final war in Sri Lanka also distanced Indian 
Tamils from the LTTE organization. One prominent example was the LTTE restriction 
on innocent Tamils migrating to India as refugees. The organization kept them in Sri 
Lanka as human shields, putting innocent Tamils in dire situations. Thousands of Tamils 
were trapped inside a small area and suffered from unsanitary conditions and starvation. 
However, the LTTE did not consider their grievances, further alienating the Tamil Nadu 
people. 
Ultimately, socio-political changes occurred both in India and Sri Lanka 
that drastically reduced Tamil Nadu pressure on the center in favor of the LTTE. This 
situation paved the way for India to continue with its hands-off policy towards Sri Lanka. 
As with the 1980s, it was the same Congress government that embraced a strong 
interventionist attitude. During that period, the Indian government changed its policy in 
Sri Lanka to satisfy the Tamil Nadu community. However, when Tamil Nadu pressure 
was weakened in 2006, the Indian government was no longer in a position where they 
had to intervene in Sri Lanka. This situation clearly indicates that Indian domestic 
concerns drove India’s intervention policy in Sri Lanka. 
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3. Strategic Concerns and Non-intervention 
Even though a hands-off policy was advantageous for India domestically, the 
same policy created unfavorable conditions for India strategically. The main 
disadvantage was the establishment of non-regional connections by the Sri Lankan 
government to obtain military supplies for the war. Some of these connections directly 
jeopardized the security of India, but domestic concerns were more important for India 
than strategic ones. Therefore, India did not intervene in the Sri Lankan issue.  
Indian government did not intervene because of two domestic objectives. First, 
India did not want to give a life to the LTTE in a situation in which there was no 
coordinated and effective domestic pressure to intervene. By that time, India had clearly 
understood the threat of the LTTE to internal stability in India in the future. If India 
decided to intervene, that decision needed to be compulsorily in support of the Tamils. 
That was the expectation of the people in Tamil Nadu. However, such intervention could 
eventually strengthen the LTTE. Therefore, India forgot its strategic disadvantages and 
did not intervene. Second, India did not want to agitate Tamil Nadu by intervening in 
support of the government of Sri Lanka. There was a pressure not to intervene in support 
of the Government of Sri Lanka. In such a situation, the best strategy that India had to 
embrace was the non-intervention, even though it was strategically disadvantageous. 
India’s non-interventionist attitude during the final period of war in Sri Lanka 
negatively affected the strategic concerns of India in many ways. As India did not 
provide the military assistance that it required, the government of Sri Lanka leaned 
towards Pakistan, China, and Israel. This alliance with non-regional powers provided 
them a disproportionate leverage in the South-Asian region. China’s power projection in 
the region was prominent.226 It gave one billion dollars in 2008 to build three highways 
in Sri Lanka and it was the main contributor to the new port in Hambanthota. In the same 
manner, China constructed ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma as a part of its 
naval strategy to protect an energy supply lane between the South China Sea and the 
Persian Gulf. 
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Similarly, India’s refusal to facilitate peace talks degraded India’s importance in 
the region and paved the way for Norway to lead Western countries into South Asian 
affairs. This situation proved that India was a failed security manager in the region. It 
negatively affected India’s request to have a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council. 
In fact, these non-regional connections of Sri Lanka sidelined India from the Sri Lankan 
issue. 
There were considerable strategic concerns that might have pressured India to 
intervene in Sri Lanka during the final war period; however, India did not intervene, 
indicating that strategic concerns did not play a major role in shaping India’s decision on 
intervention in Sri Lanka.   
4. Complexities of Domestic Aspirations of India and Its Affects to Non-
intervention 
Even though the Tamil Nadu community was divided into many factions over the 
LTTE issue, it was in harmony over its concern for innocent Tamils trapped in the war 
zone. Being the dominant power in the region and having 60 million Tamils inside its 
borders, India was ethically obliged to safeguard innocent Tamils. Success in this regard 
helped India legitimize its qualifications to become a permanent member in the UN 
Security Council. In addition, involvement in a humanitarian mission enhanced the 
hegemonic stance of India in the South-Asian region. 
At the same time, India wanted to eliminate the LTTE issue from Sri Lanka, for 
many reasons, but India was not in a position to support the government of Sri Lanka 
because of concerns with its own Tamil Nadu community. The major reason India 
wanted to crack down on the LTTE was its growing military capabilities and successes in 
battles.227 At that time, the LTTE controlled much of the sea area between India and Sri 
Lanka. Many Indian fishermen were harassed by LTTE sea tigers. Further, control of this 
sea area by non-state actors negatively affected the “Setu Samudram” channel project of 
India. No ships liked sailing in the troubled waters. Meanwhile, India considered the 
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growing air power of the LTTE as a great threat for it after Indian security captured a 
LTTE member with maps of nuclear power plants and economic centers in South 
India.228 
In addition to its military capabilities, the successes of the LTTE in Sri Lanka 
were considered a threat by India. By that time, the LTTE controlled one-third of the 
country with full-fledged military forces, a policing system, and an administrative 
system. It was a separate state with all the basic necessities, even though it did not have 
legal recognition as such. Under these circumstances, the LTTE would not be satisfied 
with anything short of Eelam. This situation in Sri Lanka was viewed by Indian rulers as 
dangerous. It would also very likely spillover into India in the future. Therefore, India 
wanted to crackdown on the LTTE. The ongoing war in Sri Lanka was a golden 
opportunity to fulfill that aspiration. 
5. Non-intervention and Achievement of Aspirations 
When the war in 2006 started in Sri Lanka, India systematically distracted its 
Tamil Nadu population from the LTTE organization. India convinced the Tamil Nadu 
populace that the LTTE was not the true representative of the Tamil community in Sri 
Lanka. Activities like the killing of Karuna faction members, forced conscription of child 
soldiers, and the assassination of veteran Tamil leaders like Sri Lankan Foreign Minister 
Laxman Kadiragarmer convinced the Tamil Nadu people of the true nature of the LTTE. 
Because of these realities, India could openly support the government of Sri 
Lanka in crushing the LTTE, but instead, India preferred a negotiated political 
settlement.229 India emphasized the protection of the rights of all communities in the 
country under a united and undivided Sri Lanka, but this idea was presented in an 
extremely moderate tone. On October 6, 2008, Indian National Security Advisor M K 
Narayan summoned the Sri Lankan deputy high commissioner to communicate India’s 
concern over the safety of Tamils in the war zone. Later, External Affairs Minister 
Pranab Mukherjee stated that India would do all in its power to improve the humanitarian 
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situation in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, a high-ranking Indian delegation frequently visited Sri 
Lanka to monitor the situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The main focus was to explore a 
solution that would satisfy the Tamil Nadu people. 
Actually, there was no requirement to intervene, as India had in 1980s, to achieve 
the demands of the Tamil Nadu people. The Sri Lankan government promised to ensure 
the safety and well-being of the Tamil community in the war zone. On January 29, 2009, 
at the request of Mukherjee, the government of Sri Lanka declared a safe zone for 
civilians and a 48-hour period for them to settle in the area.230 After establishing the safe 
zone, the President of Sri Lanka invited Karunanidhi and Jayalalitha to tour it. 
Meanwhile, the government maintained a food supply from Colombo to Kankasanthurai, 
the only port in the Jaffna peninsula, despite heavy opposition by the LTTE sea tigers. Sri 
Lanka further promised not to use heavy artillery in order to minimize co-lateral damage. 
All these activities were monitored by a high-level board appointed by India.231  
At the beginning of the war, India did not believe that Sri Lankan forces would 
win the war in Sri Lanka militarily, since the LTTE—at that time—was a strong force 
that could overrun army camps, killing thousands of soldiers in a day. For instance, on 
July 18, 1996, the LTTE killed 1200 soldiers and acquired U.S. $70 million worth of 
military equipment from the Mulativu army base.232 When the war progressed with clear 
victories for government forces, India clandestinely altered its policy regarding the Sri 
Lankan war. It viewed the progressive situation as a golden opportunity for India to avoid 
this problem in the future.233 As C. A. Chandraprema correctly pointed out, “the idea that 
there was no military solution to the conflict, which had been the center piece of earlier 
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Indian statements on Sri Lanka, had been dropped. From this time until the end of the 
war, the Indians never again said that there was no military solution to the conflict.”234  
 India followed a hands-off policy to fulfill its second aspiration. Since pro-LTTE 
Tamil Nadu pressure inside India was weak, the Indian government could easily continue 
with its policy. While India was careful not to provide offensive weapons to Sri Lankan 
government forces, it also did not restrict Sri Lanka from obtaining offensive weapons 
from other countries. Even though India did not provide the Sri Lankan government with 
offensive weapons—in an effort to avoid possible domestic instigations—India managed 
to give it some military equipment, which was defensive in nature. It included five 
transport helicopters, two air-surveillance RADARs, and an off-shore patrol vessel 
without military fittings.235 India achieved two objectives by providing equipments of 
defensive nature to Sri Lanka. First, India convinced Sri Lanka that India also ready to 
support Sri Lanka like China and Pakistan. By that India wanted to break the monopoly 
of China’s military supplies. Demonstrating that aspiration, then India’s National 
Security Advisor, M.K. Narayanan said, “We strongly believe that whatever requirements 
the Sri Lankan government have, they should come to us and we will give them what we 
think necessary. We do not favor them going to China or Pakistan or any other 
country.”236 Second, while appeasing the government of Sri Lanka, India wanted to show 
Tamil Nadu that defensive equipment did not jeopardize the security of innocent Tamils. 
The aim was to minimize Tamil Nadu’s opposition..  
E. INDIAN POLICY AFTER TERMINATION OF ETHNIC WAR IN SRI 
LANKA 
The ethnic issue in Sri Lanka had been affecting India’s domestic stability at 
various levels for some time, so termination of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was very 
important for the maintenance of domestic stability in India. A peaceful situation in Sri 
Lanka would place the Tamil Nadu populace in a position where they no longer had any 
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reason to pressure the central government. Therefore, India endeavored to maintain the 
territorial integrity and political stability of post-war Sri Lanka at all costs. This objective 
was clearly exemplified by India’s backing of a martial U.N. Security Council resolution 
calling for an international investigation into alleged abuses during the final war in Sri 
Lanka.237 India did not want international organizations to again agitate the resolved 
situation. 
Along with the international inquiry, politicians in Tamil Nadu also urged the 
Indian central government to take actions against alleged human rights abuses during the 
final war in Sri Lanka. However, the Indian government took no action against the 
government of Sri Lanka. Indian support for the U.N. resolution and responsiveness to 
the voice of the Tamil Nadu populace would have signified acceptance by India of the 
possibility of violations in Sri Lanka. It might serve to indicate that India had failed in 
protecting innocent Tamil lives in Sri Lanka.238 It could instigate Tamil nationalists in 
Tamil Nadu to blame the central government. Further, it might have negatively affected 
India’s desire to become a permanent member in the U.N. Security Council. Therefore, 
by opposing the resolution, India could argue to Tamil Nadu that the central government 
was confident that there had not been human rights abuses during the final war period. In 
this domestic setting, India was compelled to vote against the Security Council 
Resolution.  
Even though the Security Council did not pass the resolution, the U.N. Secretary 
General appointed a panel of experts to investigate whether human rights abuse had taken 
place in Sri Lanka. The draft report was given to the government of Sri Lanka to get its 
response prior to publication. The government vehemently opposed not only the contents 
of the report but also the legitimacy of the panel to publicize such a document. This 
incident was given widespread media publicity in both India and Sri Lanka 
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This situation agitated Tamil Nadu again. New Chief Minister M. Jayalalitha, who 
was an opponent of the LTTE during the final war in Sri Lanka, demanded an 
international inquiry against Sri Lanka and insisted on slapping trade sanctions on Sri 
Lanka.239 Further, she promised the people of Tamil Nadu that she would pressure the 
central government to revise its Sri Lankan policy and bring the guilty to justice. She 
acted in favor of the Tamils in Sri Lanka because she had won the Tamil Nadu election 
using alleged human rights violations as a trump card. 
This situation led the Indian government to lose credibility, and its relations with 
Tamil Nadu coalition partners became an irritant.240 Furthermore, this situation 
convinced the Indian central government to pay less attention to the grievances of Tamils 
in Sri Lanka. This situation paved the way for Indian nationalistic factions to gain 
momentum and spread nationalism throughout Tamil Nadu. This growing domestic 
situation did not allow the Indian government to maintain its persistent stance with regard 
to the Sri Lankan issue in the international forum. India had to change its policy decisions 
based on domestic concerns. 
India displayed a considerable policy shift in 2012. On March 12, India voted for 
a U.S.-sponsored resolution against Sri Lanka in the 19th session of the Human Rights 
Council held in Geneva. While Asian countries like China, Pakistan, Maldives, 
Bangladesh, and Indonesia voted in favor of Sri Lanka, surprisingly, India used its vote 
against Sri Lanka to pass the resolution.241 India, which had vehemently opposed a state-
centric resolution in 2009, changed its course 180 degrees in just three years. Even 
though India had not wanted to destabilize the situation in Sri Lanka by casting its vote 
for a resolution against Sri Lanka, India was compelled to do so because of growing 
domestic pressure in the country. Even though the main factor behind Tamil Nadu’s 
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pressure on the center—the LTTE—no longer existed, the Indian government still 
changed its policy decisions with regard to Sri Lanka based on the desires of India’s 
Tamil Nadu populace. In other words, domestic concerns are the factor that have 
consistently shaped—and continue to shape—India’s decisions about Sri Lanka, even 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to shed light upon how domestic concerns, strategic 
concerns, and a combination of both domestic and strategic concerns come into play 
when strong countries intervene in weaker countries by looking at the specific case of 
Indian intervention in Sri Lanka—based upon the hypothesis that Indian strategic 
interests remained fairly constant and domestic interest varied, resulting in an alternating 
pattern of intervention decisions. Presently, there is no civil war in Sri Lanka, but various 
separatist Tamil groups in many countries in the world, including India, still struggling 
for a separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka. India’s decision in this regard will be the 
decisive factor as in the past. Therefore, understanding the motives that drove India’s 
intervention decisions is essential to support formulation of a national and foreign policy 
in Sri Lanka to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with India for years to come. 
During the period between contemporary independence to the initiation of ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan rulers made many decisions that directly affected the 
strategic concerns of India. These incidents jeopardized India’s security in the region and 
established strategic reasons for Indians to intervene in Sri Lanka—but India did not 
intervene. It always tried to maintain a cordial relationship with Sri Lanka. This clearly 
evidences that strategic concerns were not the driving factor behind India’s decision for 
intervention during this period.  
Similar to strategic concerns, some of the political decisions of Sri Lankan rulers 
had an impact on Tamil Nadu, and to a certain extent raised domestic concerns in India to 
intervene in Sri Lanka. However, these incidents did not have an impact that was strong 
enough to prompt an intervention by India. Even though these incidents raised Indian 
domestic concerns to a certain extent, other internal and external threats to the central 
government during this period overextended the military and left minimal room for the 
Indian government to intervene.  
In sum, it is clear that it was the non-availability of strong domestic concerns that 
moved them to act otherwise which was behind India’s non-intervention during the 
 100
period between contemporary independence and the initiation of the ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka. Even though there were strategic reasons to intervene, India did not—which 
indicates that strategic concerns were not the driving factor shaping India’s intervention 
during this period.  
Existing situation behind the relationship between India and Sri Lanka is very 
much similar to the period between contemporary independence to initiation of ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s keeps close relations with countries that have problems 
with India and make the setting for India to intervene on strategic reasons, and there is no 
strong domestic pressure to the Indian central government to intervene in Sri Lanka as the 
LTTE problem in Sri Lanka is over. As a result, India keeps a cordial relationship as in 
the 1960s and 1970s. That means non-availability of strong domestic concerns to 
intervene is a concrete factor that shapes India’s decision of non-intervention in the past, 
in the present, and for sure in the future. 
Moving away from their cordial relationship, India embraced an interventionist 
attitude in the 1980s, and this attitude remained consistent for nearly a decade. During 
this period, intervention in Sri Lanka was strategically disadvantageous for India, due to 
the nature of regional power politics of India; however, strong pressure from Tamil Nadu 
compelled India to intervene in Sri Lanka. During this period, maintaining unity in the 
highly complex society of India in order to maintain a stable domestic situation was the 
highest priority of the government.  
In the 1980s, Tamil Nadu was the main source of Indian domestic pressure for 
intervention in Sri Lanka. With the anti-Tamil riots in 1983, India was compelled to take 
actions against Sri Lanka since the people in Tamil Nadu strongly pressured the central 
government to intervene. The Indian central government could not ignore the pressure 
from Tamil Nadu, since it was very important economically and politically. In this light, 
Tamil Nadu became the prominent domestic concern of India that drove its intervention 
in Sri Lanka. It was this domestic pressure that compelled India to intervene in Sri Lanka 
in 1983. 
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Even though there was considerable pressure from Tamil Nadu, the Indian 
government—led by Indira Gandhi—tried to settle the issue peacefully by launching a 
two-pronged policy to remove the domestic pressure while winning the hearts and minds 
of Sri Lankans. This policy decision of the Indian government clearly indicates that India 
embraced its interventionist attitude in 1983 purely as a result of the pressure from Tamil 
Nadu. If India had strategic interest to intervene, it might not have attempted to solve the 
problem through the process of negotiation.  
After her assassination, the Indo-Lanka relationship entered a less interventionist 
and more cordial phase under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi. If India had a strategic 
concern to intervene in Sri Lanka, Indira Gandhi’s policy would not have changed with 
the transition in leadership. As the pressure behind the intervention came from domestic 
concerns, Rajiv could deviate from his mother’s policy. However, this non-interventionist 
phase ended after the Sri Lankan government’s operation to liberate Jaffna peninsula 
from the LTTE in 1987. Due to strong Tamil Nadu pressure, he had to intervene to stop 
the ongoing offensive against the LTTE. 
Even though the government of Sri Lanka decided to stop the operation, India’s 
interventionist attitude did not wax. India needed to find a solution for the conflict in Sri 
Lanka to minimize pressure on the central government from Tamil Nadu in the future. It 
was under this circumstance that the Indo-Lanka peace accord was signed mainly to 
address Indian domestic concerns. By sending troops, India signaled to Tamil Nadu that 
the central government was concerned about the security of innocent Tamils. The 
ultimate aim was to end Tamil Nadu pressure on the central government. In sum, it is 
obvious that India under Rajiv—who had once maintained a non-interventionist policy—
shifted to an interventionist attitude in 1987 because of domestic concerns 
India’s interventionist behavior in the 1980s provides a good explanation about 
India’s domestic constraints in which the central government has to take decisions. 
Situational decisions of Sri Lankan governments which are sensitive to Tamil Nadu 
people compelled the Indian government to intervene in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the 
government of Sri Lanka should take all possible measures to minimize the pressure on 
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the Indian central government in the future by maintaining the existing calm situation 
with regard to the Tamil problem. 
Even though the domestic concerns of India had a positive impact on its decision 
to intervene in Sri Lanka,, when it came to the 2000s, the domestic concerns of India 
discouraged a decision for intervention. As a result, India transformed its interventionist 
attitude, which was prominent in the 1980s, to hands-off policy in the 2000s. Setbacks of 
the IPKF and the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE were the 
main reasons that India stuck to a non-interventionist and hands-off policy in the 2000s. 
In addition, the growing domestic nationalistic politics, political uncertainty in India, and  
socio-political changes of political leaders and the people in Tamil Nadu pressured India 
to step back from the issue in Sri Lanka. When all the causes for the maintenance of 
India’s hands-off policy towards Sri Lanka are analyzed, it is evident that the domestic 
concerns of India were the driving factor that shaped this decision.  
India’s decision to not intervene to save the lives of Sri Lankan soldiers who 
trapped in the Jaffna peninsula in 2000 was a significant incident, and it indicated two 
significant things. First, it provided evidence that strategic concerns were not the reason 
for India’s non-intervention decision.. At that time, intervention was strategically 
advantageous for India because it could have served to minimize non-regional power 
intervention into the issue. However, India did not intervene. Therefore, India’s non-
intervention is clear evidence that strategic concerns were not the driving factor shaping 
India’s decision for intervention or non-intervention.  
Second, this incident evidences that domestic concerns were the main factor 
behind India’s non-intervention decision. At that time, there were nationalistic groups in 
Tamil Nadu who sustained support for Tamil militants. In such a domestic situation, 
support for Sri Lankan government forces was not advisable, since the situation in Tamil 
Nadu was highly unpredictable. India’s non-intervention in 2000 clearly demonstrates 
how India’s intervention decisions were shaped by domestic concerns.  
India’s behavior during the final war in Sri Lanka between 2006 and 2009 was 
drastically different from its behavior in 1987. In 1987, India directly intervened to stop 
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military offensive against the LTTE, but in 2006, India did not intervene and allowed Sri 
Lanka to defeat the LTTE. India’s non-intervention jeopardized its security in the 
region—but India stuck to its non-intervention policy, ignoring many strategic concerns. 
It demonstrates how strategic concerns did not affect India’s non-intervention during the 
final war in Sri Lanka. 
When the relationship between domestic concerns and intervention is considered, 
it is clear that the weakness of domestic concerns in support of intervention was the main 
reason of non-intervention during the final war in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it evidences 
how the Indian decision for Intervention in Sri Lanka changed in accord with the strength 
of domestic concerns. For all of these reasons, the Indian government did not have any 
reason to intervene in Sri Lanka—which clearly illustrates the strength of the domestic 
concerns that were the driving factor behind India’s intervention. 
Meanwhile, some domestic concerns discouraged India to intervene in Sri 
Lanka—in an attempt to achieve other domestic interests. Therefore, India earnestly 
sought an end to the problem in Sri Lanka. Maintaining a hands-off policy, and avoiding 
support for any party, was the best strategy that India could embrace at the time. 
India’s motivation for intervention was obvious even after the war in Sri Lanka. 
Just after the war, India marshaled a U.N. Resolution against Sri Lanka.. India did not 
want Tamil Nadu to arise up again based on the belief that India supported the violation 
of innocent Tamils by the government of Sri Lanka. However, when pressure built up in 
Tamil Nadu after the U.N. Secretary General’s panel report, India changed its mind and 
supported the U.S.-sponsored resolution against Sri Lanka. Similarly, Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi also had to change his cordial relations with Sri Lanka due to a growing 
pressure from Tamil Nadu in 1980s. It means that even though the main factor behind 
Tamil Nadu pressure upon the central government—the LTTE—no longer exists, the 
Indian government still changes policy decisions with regard to Sri Lanka based on the 
aspirations of Tamil Nadu people. In other words, domestic concerns are the factor which 
continues to shape India’s decisions with regard to Sri Lanka, even after the war.  
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As far as the future is concerned, India’s decisions about intervention will be 
constrained by domestic factors, especially the influence of Tamil Nadu. This factor will 
continue to limit the maneuverability of India’s intervention policy in Sri Lanka. Even 
though the problem in Sri Lanka has effectively ended, the problem still remains for 
India—since the aftermath of the war still haunts Tamil Nadu. Therefore, India will act 
earnestly to appease Tamil Nadu by assisting Sri Lanka with its rehabilitation and 
resettlement process. India already took the initiative in this process by recently 
promising to build 50,000 houses for displaced Tamils in the eastern and northern parts 
of Sri Lanka. Further, India provided financial assistance for infrastructure development 
in the predominant Tamil areas. In addition, Indian government encouraged both the 
government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the prominent Tamil 
political party, to engage in talks to settle the problematic issues. 
While attempting to win the hearts and minds of the people in Tamil Nadu, India 
will work to establish good relations between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. Recently, India 
formed a ferry service between Rameshwaran and Colombo to improve passage between 
the two communities. Responding promptly, the government of Sri Lanka started the 
Kachchativu feast, which had been halted because of the war. It is a feast that both Sri 
Lankan and Indian Tamils celebrate once a year. Similarly, India’s economic investments 
in Sri Lanka will be a decisive factor in the future. India will work to establish strong 
economic relations with Sri Lanka to contain China’s hegemonic spread in the South 
Asian region. India will attempt to replace China as the source of Sri Lankan economic 
and security interests. 
Even though the situation after the elimination of the LTTE is favorable for Indo-
Lanka relations, the issue with regard to fishing issue in the Palk Bay has not been 
properly addressed yet. Still fishermen from Tamil Manu move in to Sri Lankan waters 
for fishing and the Sri Lanka navy arrest them regularly. This is the most debatable topic 
among the Tamil Nadu politicians. They complain about the central government’s failure 
to protect fishermen of Tamil Nadu. This issue will be a problematic one in the future if 
both governments do not address the problem promptly. 
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In addition to fishing issue, there will be new situations where India will have to 
consider intervention—as it has over a history of 2500 years; however, unlike in the past, 
future policy makers will have to consider many factors. First, India should not over-
estimate its power and under-estimate the determination of opponents. Second, India 
should not ambiguous about how they approach intervention under the constraints of 
resources and political will. Third, as Sri Lanka is not currently under any obligation to 
remain close to India, India should not take for granted the possibility that Sri Lanka 
might lean towards non-regional powers. Fourth, if India intervenes over issues related to 
Tamil grievances, the Indian government should be ready to address the grievances of 
many communities within India. Finally, the Indian government should convince Tamil 
Nadu about the limitations and constraints of India’s ability to effectively intervene in a 
sovereign country. 
This research carried out an historical analysis about concerns related to Indian 
intervention, but how will the findings be applicable in the future? Will the Tamil Nadu 
factor continue to be a decisive one in future situations where there are no Sinhala-Tamil 
conflicts in Sri Lanka? Will India ignore Tamil Nadu pressure as it did in the 1960s and 
1970s—or will it embrace an interventionist attitude as in the 1980s? In fact, will the 
people in Tamil Nadu concern themselves with the well-being of Tamils in Sri Lanka as 
they did during the war period in Sri Lanka? Will the Indian government allow Sri Lanka 
create any situation which affects the domestic stability of India in the future? These are 
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